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BRODIE'S AIDS TO HISTORY
(Advanced Level)

General Editor: J. S. DUGDALE, M.A.

RUSSIA IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY (1904—1924)

by

S. H. WOOD, M.A.

JAMES BRODIE LTD.
BRODIE HOUSE, QUEEN SQUARE,
BATH, SOMERSET, ENGLAND

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CHRONOLOGY

NICHOLAS II, Czar **1894–1917.**

Nicholas was 26 when he succeeded his father, Alexander III.

1901. Opening of the Trans-Siberian Railway as part of Russia's eastward expansion.

1904–5. The Russo-Japanese War.

1904. 10–18 October, defeat of Russian Army in the battle of the Sha River.

1905. 3 January, surrender of Port Arthur to the Japanese.

1–10 March, defeat of Russian army at Mukden.

27–28 May, defeat of Russian navy at Tsushima.

5 September, signing of Treaty of Portsmouth ending the war.

1905. Revolution in Russia forcing the Czar to allow a duma to meet.

22 January, 'Bloody Sunday', the massacre of demonstrators asking for reforms.

27 October, first meeting of the St. Petersburg Soviet.

30 October, The October Manifesto giving concessions to the revolutionaries.

16 December, end of the Soviet.

1906. 10 May to 21 July, meeting of the First Duma.

1907. 2 March to 16 June, meeting of the Second Duma.

1907–12. The Third Duma.

1912–17. The Fourth Duma.

1906–11. Stolypin, Prime Minister.

1906. 18 October and 22 November, Stolypin's decrees reforming agriculture.

1907. Anglo-Russian Convention settling points of dispute.

1914–17. The First World War against Austria-Hungary and Germany.

1914. Heavy defeat for Russia at Tannenberg.

1917. 8 March (23 February on the old calendar still used in Russia till 1918) the revolution that forced the abdication of Nicholas II.

14 March, Petrograd Soviet issued Order No. 1.

16 April, return of Lenin from exile.

18 May, reorganisation of the Provisional Government.

16–17 July, failure of attempted Bolshevik revolt.

20 July, Kerensky succeeded Lvov as Prime Minister.

9–14 September, attempt by General Kornilov to seize power.

6 November (24 October) the Bolsheviks overthrew Kerensky and seized power.

17 December, armistice signed with the Germans.

1918. 3 March, Treaty of Brest-Litovsk signed with Germany, handing over large areas of the Russian Empire.

1918–21. War Communism.

1918 (May) to 1920 (November). The Civil War between the Whites (with foreign aid) and the Bolsheviks.

1920. May to October, war with Poland.

1921. March, Treaty of Riga with Poland.

1921. March, the Beginning of the New Economic Policy, ending War Communism.

1922. Treaty of Rapallo with Germany.

1924. 21 January, the death of Lenin.

GENERAL READING LIST

Histories of Russia

Charques: *A Short History of Russia.*
Clarkson: *A History of Russia.*
Kochan: *The Making of Modern Russia.*
Pares: *A History of Russia.*
Sumner: *A Survey of Russian History.*
Treadgold: *Russia in the 20th Century.*
The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Russia and the Soviet Union.

The Rule of Nicholas II

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia.*
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia.*
Troyat: *Daily Life in Russia under the Last Czar.*
Pares: *The Fall of the Russian Monarchy.*

The Revolutions of 1917 and the Revolutionaries

Chamberlain: *The Russian Revolution* (2 vols.).
Carr: *The Bolshevik Revolution* (3 vols.).
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution.*
Carr: *Bakunin.*
Reed: 10 *Days that Shook the World.*
Wolfe: *Three Who Made a Revolution.*
Wilson: *To the Finland Station.*
Hill: *Lenin and the Russian Revolution.*
Deutscher: *Stalin.*
Deutscher: *Trotsky: The Prophet Armed.*
Deutscher: *Trotsky: The Prophet Unarmed.*
Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*

Communism

Carew-Hunt: *The Theory and Practice of Communism.*
Marx: *Capital.*
Marx and Engels: *The Communist Manifesto.*
Lenin: *What is to be Done?*
Lenin: *The State and Revolution.*
Trotsky: *A History of the Russian Revolution.*
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled.*
Berlin: *Karl Marx.*

Economic Affairs

Dobb: *Soviet Economic Development.*
Maynard: *The Russian Peasant.*
Robinson: *Rural Russia under the Old Régime.*
Miller: *The Economic Development in Russia*, 1905–1914.

Foreign Policy

Taylor: *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe*, 1848–1914.
Kennan: *Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin.*
Kennan: *Russia leaves the War.*
Wheeler-Bennett: *Brest-Litovsk, the Forgotten Peace.*
Kennan: *The Decision to Intervene.*
Footman: *The Civil War in Russia.*

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Nicholas II, the last of the Czars, ruled (1894–1917) a state whose massive size and hugh potential he neither efficiently controlled nor adequately exploited. His titles, his claims to total authority, had a universal, medieval impressiveness, but the splendour of the Romanoff dynasty was a poor answer to the strength of industrialised Western Europe. Russia lagged decades behind the U.S.A., Britain, Germany and France; her industrial revolution was later and less vigorous for she lacked skilled workmen and adequate capital.

The attempts of earlier rulers, especially Peter I, and Catherine II, to raise Russia to a powerful position, had helped Alexander I to achieve military success against Napoleon. Russia was respected, if not loved, as "Europe's policeman." But the Russian 'steamroller' (as Russia's hopeful allies described her military machine) was totally unsuited to twentieth century warfare. In two disastrous conflicts, 1904–5 against Japan, and 1914–17 against the Austrian and German Empires, the Czar was humiliated by complete failure against technologically more advanced nations. The first war was followed by a domestic upheaval that should have been a warning to the Czar. The second war brought such a display of discontent that Nicholas was removed from power with ridiculous ease.

After months of confusion through 1917, power finally fell to the Bolsheviks, a small group of well organised and very determined revolutionaries. The Bolsheviks were a curious group. They claimed to act for the proletariat, yet most of them were bourgeois. They claimed to be applying Marxist ideas, yet Russia proved so unsuited to these ideas that they had to be seriously modified. The bulk of Russia's population remained too backward to offer serious organised resistance to their new rulers, in any case the old rulers had proved so incompetent that few could be found who were willing to fight for their

restoration. The disorganisation and apathy of non-Bolsheviks rendered them incapable of success. Instead, triumphant Bolshevism was able to represent itself as the true form of Communism, and, in the interests of 'the people', it extended its grip over Russia far more firmly and effectively than Nicholas II had ever done.

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF RUSSIA IN 1904

A. The Machinery of Government

1. *The Czar.*

Nicholas II was an autocrat. Though his power was restricted by practical difficulties, in theory it was total and was carried into all parts of the Empire by his bureaucracy, his police and his army. The nobility and church helped buttress the régime, and to peasants in distant regions the Czar was 'Little Father', a ruler ordained by God.

In his task of governing the Czar was assisted, at the centre, by three bodies:

(*a*) The Senate, the supreme judicial authority.

(*b*) The Council of State of 40 to 60 members chosen by the Czar. This Council possessed advisory functions only.

(*c*) The Council of Ministers, an executive body, without collective responsibility, in which each Minister held office at the Czar's pleasure and in which rival Ministers, or groups of Ministers, were often divided by personal hostilities.

2. *The Nobility.*

By 1904 the nobility were by no means the potent force that they had been in earlier years. Under Catherine II they had received official recognition of a privileged position, free from service and obligation (despite Peter I's efforts to turn them into a kind of Russian Junker class). But when the serfs had been emancipated after the Crimean War, the nobles had lost their power as the regional representatives of law and order. In economic life their importance declined, as industrial entrepreneurs (many of whom were foreign) were better able to provide the Czar with what he wanted. As farmers, only a minority of nobles attempted to run their estates on efficient modern principles.

3. *The Orthodox Church.*

The Church was subject to the state and ruled over by the state's representative, the procurator. Its hold on the minds of the backward peasantry (who had little to hope

for from their earthly existence) was considerable, but the church had lost the respect of the intelligentsia and was a strongly reactionary force. It persecuted minority sects, for instance the Stundists (a Russian variant of the Baptists) who, in 1894, were prohibited from holding services. Jews, especially, suffered from the hostility of the government and the church. Discriminatory legislation excluded Jews from law practice, the *zemstvos*, the city councils, and allowed them to enrol for high schools under a humiliating quota system. Outright persecution flared up from time to time in pogroms in which the government itself was sometimes implicated. In fact, the Jews were a convenient scapegoat and Nicholas II himself was unashamedly anti-Semitic.

4. *The Police.*

The *Okhrana* (secret police) operated an internal passport system, collected taxes, and attempted to seek out enemies of the government. It was riddled with corruption and exercised a terror that, by later standards, was mild; nevertheless it was hated and loathed by most Russians.

5. *The Army.*

Though the army was large, and possessed of unquestionable courage, it was badly equipped, badly led, and badly supplied. It was, moreover, recruited from the peasantry whose loyalty was suspect in an internal crisis that involved people from their own class.

6. *Local Government.*

This had been a perpetual headache to the Czars of Russia, and numerous experiments had, over the centuries all proved unsuccessful. Two obstacles could never be overcome, the corrupt inefficiency of the civil service, and the huge extent of the Empire. Local government was administered by several bodies during Nicholas II's reign:

(*a*) *The Governors-general.* They supervised the provinces into which the Empire was divided and all too easily became petty dictators. Colleges of officials assisted them, and they had to submit regular reports to the Minister of the Interior.

(*b*) *The* '*zemstvos*'. These were councils, set up in 1864

as part of Alexander II's 'Great Reforms' which were designed to avert large scale internal unrest after the Crimean War. There were *zemstvos* at provincial level and in the counties into which each province was divided. They were chosen by an indirect method of election, the voters being divided into classes (a method which secured the dominance of the gentry) and were elected for three years. A permanent governing board was chosen from among the elected delegates, and the local marshal of nobility presided over the meetings of the *zemstvos*.

They were empowered to levy a small rate on property in order to finance the running of affairs with which the government did not usually concern itself, such as roads, poor relief, health and education. This rate fell more heavily on peasant land than it did on gentry property. The *zemstvos* were established in the Russian parts of the Empire, but did not exist in the non-Russian areas. Moreover the government proceeded to whittle down the concessions it had made. Yet much good work was carried out by the *zemstvos*, especially in the field of education, and *zemstvos* employees (who came to be known as "the third element") became prominent in liberal and reformist activities and linked themselves together in the "Union of Unions".

(*c*) *The* '*dumas*'. In the towns elected councils, *dumas*, were chosen so as to exclude industrial workers. They were feeble bodies, lacking funds they could achieve little and their presidents (the town commandants) could veto their decisions.

(*d*) *The land captains.* Alexander III instituted the land captains as part of his repressive policy, and they were soon among the most loathed of government agents. They were appointed by the Minister of the Interior and were usually minor nobles. They could veto the acts of the village communes (the bodies set up to control village affairs after emancipation had ended the nobles' authority) and they controlled local justice.

7. *The nationalities.*

Sheer size made government difficult, for the Russian Empire stretched from the Black Sea to the Baltic and from the Baltic to the Pacific. Vast areas of the Empire were thinly inhabited and difficult to reach, for generations the Czars had been unable to do anything about the Cossacks who sprang from peasants who had fled to the fringes of the Empire. The population of the Empire was made up of many nationalities, Russians, Poles, Germans, Mongols, Georgians, Uzbeks, and Kazakhs, and the policy of Russification (by which the government tried to obtain uniformity) met with hostility. There were repeated Polish revolts (though these were usually confined to the upper classes) and the policy of General Bobrikov in Finland aroused great anger there, for he absorbed Finnish troops into Russian units. If it found itself in difficulties, the government could expect that the non-Russian races would be of little help, and might well seek their freedom.

B. Nicholas II

1. *Nicholas II's character.*

There are superficial similarities between the last of the Czars and Louis XVI and Charles I. All were married to unpopular wives to whom they were faithful and all were a strange mixture of morality, weakness and obstinacy. Nicholas II was a man of very limited intellectual capacity. Louis XVI's diary, even in 1789, recorded hunting and very little else; Nicholas recorded (as Trotsky declared) "an endless succession of walks." He was the son of Alexander III, a huge and determined reactionary who devoted his energies to crushing the kind of rebellious society that had plotted and effected the murder of Alexander II in 1881. Nicholas, too, believed firmly in autocracy. He proclaimed his devotion to it in a speech shortly after his accession, and he greeted a *zemstvos* proposal that he might possibly consider a constitution as "senseless dreams."

But though he believed in autocracy, Nicholas lacked the ability necessary to being an autocrat. He lacked, also, a wise adviser upon whom he could lean to counteract his own deficiencies. Maybe a Richelieu was available, both

Witte and Stolypin showed great ability, but Nicholas was influenced by his ministers for short periods only; if they met with success he became jealous of them. He was always liable to dismiss a minister who had served him faithfully, quite suddenly and with complete lack of feeling.

2. *His Advisors.*

Only three people held the Czar's trust for any length of time, his wife, the procurator, and Rasputin. Rasputin was a weird 'holy' man of quite outstanding immorality, whose aims were short term and wholly selfish. The procurator was Nicholas's former tutor, Pobedonostsev, a man utterly opposed to all forms of liberalism and representative government. Nicholas's wife was Alexandra of Hesse-Darmstadt, a German princess related to Queen Victoria. She had adopted her husband's religion with passionate zeal, and lived in a wholly unreal world in which only her husband, her children, and her religion mattered. Yet Nicholas listened to her with respect and affection, and her desire to make him a real autocrat and her utter ignorance of and scorn for the leaders of reformist and revolutionary bodies, must have seriously contributed to the downfall of the Czar.

Books

Seton Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, chs. 1 and 5.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, chs. 17, 18, 19.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, ch. 2.
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, ch. 1.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia.* chs. 1 and 2.

Questions

1. Estimate the success of Alexander III's policy of repression.

2. How secure was Czarist rule in Russia in 1904?

3. "Czarist rule and the Orthodox church were inseparable partners. The ruin of one inevitably involved the ruin of the other." Discuss.

2. INTERNAL CONDITIONS OF LIFE IN 1904

A. The Russian Peasantry

1. *The Peasant "Problem".*

According to the first official census (held in 1897) at least five-sixths of the population of 129.4 millions of the Empire were peasants. Although by far the largest of the Russian 'estates' the peasants were understood but little and (despite emancipation) were clearly marked out as an inferior section. The peasant "problem" was a continual source of worry both to those who tried to rule Russia and those who tried to subvert that rule. Revolts flared up frequently, yet when the *narodnik* intellectuals tried to organise the discontent to turn it into revolution, they failed utterly and were received stonily when they attempted to 'go to the people'.

2. *The Effects of the Emancipation from serfdom.*

Emancipation had come in 1861, but it had brought neither a bettering of living standards, nor a greater sense of meaning and purpose to peasant lives. Instead of complete personal freedom, the peasant was made subject to the village commune which had coercive powers and which was responsible for tax payment, controlling the land, and arranging the crop rotation. The peasant alone paid the poll tax; he alone could be flogged; and the land that he had received upon emancipation had to be paid for in redemption fees to the state (who had compensated the landowners). These plots were about half the area that the peasant had formerly cultivated, they were thus often too small to be economic, a problem which was aggravated by the rising population.

The peasants were not a united group, however, for the majority lived in huts made of wood or earth, with little furniture, and were sunk in ignorance and illiteracy, a misery fitfully relieved by alcohol and by religion. Some peasants, the *kulaks*, were wealthier and could employ labour, whilst other peasants had no land at all. The government made some effort to lessen peasant suffering, as follows:

(*a*) in 1881 and 1884 redemptions were scaled down,

(*b*) in 1886 the poll tax was abolished,

(*c*) a Peasants' Bank was set up to aid land purchase on credit (the *kulaks* benefited from this, not the mass of the peasants),

(*d*) from 1889 migration to Siberia was encouraged.

These efforts were insufficient, peasants sought to rent land to increase their holdings and this competition drove up rents to impossible heights. Those peasants who sought refuge in the towns did not find there conditions to make them feel that the existing situation was satisfactory, or even tolerable. Low wages, the truck system, feeble social legislation, poor living conditions and all the evils of the industrial revolution were present in the expanding cities. The peasant problem remained apparently insoluble, then, and the only man to attempt at least a partial solution, Stolypin, the dominating minister after the war of 1904 to 1905, was murdered in a plot in which the Czar's police seem to have been at least implicated.

B. The Economy

1. *Introduction.*

In 1904 Russia was still an overwhelmingly agricultural nation. Yet agriculture was inefficient, producing a low yield in relation to the manpower employed, and providing a standard of living that was low in comparison with the standard in much of Western Europe. Heavy industry, and the communications so necessary for industrial expansion, were both weak, indeed the eastern regions of the Empire were scarcely affected by industry at all. Russia was, therefore, dependent upon imports for a wide range of capital and consumer goods. There was a marked lack of native capital available for investment, which severely restricted the rate of industrial growth, for the state's finances were never very healthy and many foreign capitalists were suspicious of Russia. If communications were to be expanded to a reasonable level, this could be achieved only by clamping down on the rate of industrial growth.

2. *Industry.*

The chief Russian industries included: the coal and iron

of the Donetz, Dnieper, Moscow, St. Petersburg and Polish regions: oil in Baku: a textile industry that was relatively advanced. All of them depended on foreign capital and foreign skill, and they provided a livelihood for 10 per cent of the population at most. Even those involved in the industries often maintained their links with the countryside, returning there to assist with the harvesting. The lack of native capital led not only to dependence on foreign capital (chiefly British, French and German) but also to considerable state intervention, and the absence of a resolute and independently-minded capitalist class. The extent of foreign investment can be illustrated from the Donetz coal basin where, before 1914, one half of the capital invested was foreign. In the oil and metallurgical industries foreign investment was even heavier, reaching at least 80 per cent.

3. *The Condition of the Workers.*

For most workers life in industrial areas was miserable. Many lived in barrack-like lodgings, wages were low and the constant influx of new labour kept them low. Bread prices rose far more than did real wages. Working hours were long, rarely less than 12 to 14 hours, and possibly as high as 16 to 18 hours. Fines of various sorts helped further to depress living standards and the factories in which men and women laboured for so long were designed for machines, not for humans, and were therefore often unsafe and insanitary.

4. *Government intervention to improve working conditions.*

(*a*) *Legislation.* The government's attempts to remedy this situation were tentative and feeble. There was factory legislation and there were inspectors, chiefly as a result of the work of Bunge, Minister of Finance, 1881–1886, but none of the enactments was adequately enforced. Such reforms met with a mixed reception, for in some regions employers were fairly co-operative, and in others they were completely hostile. In St. Petersburg the supply of labour sometimes exceeded the demand, wages were higher than in other regions, and conditions a little better.

But in Moscow there was far more labour available than employers needed and consequently the factory owners or managers were utterly opposed to social legislation. In any case, Bunge was dismissed and replaced by a minister less sympathetic towards social legislation.

(*b*) *Police unions.* The Government was very suspicious of any attempts to create trade unions, fearing the political ends to which such bodies might be turned. But though unions were illegal, the government itself became implicated in workers' organisations in a double-dealing scheme that was typical of the activities of the police department. Zubatov, a police chief, was allowed to organise a union in order to attract workers away from more revolutionary organisations. In 1902 the Society of Mutual Help of Workers in Mechanised Production was set up, with a statute drawn up by professors of the Moscow University. With the help of Plehve, the Minister of the Interior (and an ex-policeman) laws were passed for the election of factory elders to represent the workers' interests and carry complaints to employers. In this way the government hoped that social discontent would be kept out of political channels, but this proved wholly unrealistic and before long a police union set up in Odessa by Shaevich got out of hand and provoked massive strikes.

5. *Sergius Witte* (1849–1915).

Witte was a vigorous, ambitious, and rather unscrupulous administrator who served as Minister of Communications from 1892–1903, and then as Minister of Finance. He was the driving force behind a big railway expansion scheme that, by 1903, had given Russia 40,000 miles of track (two-thirds of which were operated by the state) and added another 8,000 between 1903 and 1914. Yet even this was ludicrously inadequate for so vast a land, and the low output of coal meant that many locomotives had to burn wood. As for Russian roads, it would be

flattering to compare them with English roads in the early 18th century.

As Finance Minister, Witte encouraged the building up of gold reserves. To finance this move, heavy grain exports were necessary plus tariffs on sugar, tea, and other imports that made these necessities very costly. However, this policy led to Russia adopting the gold standard in 1897, foreign confidence was increased in Russia and, as Witte had intended, more overseas capital was attracted.

Witte's policy was not popular with the peasantry who found producing a surplus difficult. Grain made up over half Russian exports in 1914, but it was provided by only a small minority of the farmers. The majority of the peasantry were too backward, and owned too little land to be able to produce a surplus for sale, moreover the growth of factories hit the rural industries through which many of the peasants were accustomed to supplement their earnings. Such additional earnings might have enabled peasants to find a little extra grain to sell, but in Nicholas's reign these earnings dwindled steadily.

6. *Agriculture.*

The productivity of Russian farmland was low, partly because many areas had a poor soil (although the black-earth region stretching from Bessarabia in a narrow belt to Western Siberia, was rich), and also because of primitive farming methods. The three-field system was still the common method, with all its defects of fallow land, strips that could be miles apart, insufficient pasture and a lack of manure. In some areas the same crop was produced year after year on the same land, exhausting the soil so that it had to be left fallow for as many as ten years. The farming implements used were crude, the peasants lacked capital, and, above all, the area of cultivated land per head of population was too small—about 3 acres in fact, less than in either France or Germany.

These difficulties placed poorer peasants at the mercy of the *kulaks** who had tools to loan—at a price—and were prepared to advance seed corn against a share of the harvest. By the time harvest time came most peasants were sorely in need of money, they therefore sold off their

**kulak* = literally, 'fist'.

crops at once and by glutting the market, only obtained a low price. The *kulaks*, however, could afford to buy up cheap grain and sell again at a more profitable moment. This sort of exploitation made it easy, later, for the Communists to mobilise poor peasants against the *kulaks*.

The wretched conditions stemming from insufficient land had been aggravated by the Emancipation carried out by Alexander II. A peasant who wished to escape the burden of redemption dues was allowed a plot of land one quarter of the standard size. Such plots were so pathetically inadequate that they came to be known as 'poverty lots', and it was obviously necessary for most peasants to burden themselves with the redemption dues. In the fertile black earth region, landlords tended to cling on to considerable areas and peasants (often cultivating less after emancipation than before) could only obtain extra land to rent at inflated rates. The land obtained by the Peasants' Bank was insufficient to relieve the pressure, in any case most of this land went to the *kulaks*. Emigration to the towns and to outlying provinces was insufficient to solve the situation.

Thus a situation of explosive potential was being built up in the countryside, and the value of the mir (the village commune) as a controlling and equalising factor was low. The Government's efforts to relieve this crisis were puny, apart from the Peasants' Bank, emigration, and the scaling down of redemption dues, all it could do was to try and aid rural crafts and industries. 'Artels', co-operative methods of running rural industry, were set up, but these proved ineffective. Yet though an explosive situation was coming about the revolutionaries proved quite unable to control and canalise it. The peasants would move in their own way, in their own time, and for their own ends.

Books

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 2.
Dobb: *Soviet Economic Development*, chs. 1 and 2.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, chs. 1, 3 and 4.
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, ch. 1.

Troyat: *Daily Life in Russia under the last Czar.*
Robinson: *Rural Russia under the old régime.*

Questions

1. Account for the backwardness of the Russian economy in 1900.
2. Estimate the effects of emancipation upon the Russian peasantry.
3. Describe the part played by Witte in improving the Russian economy.

3. MOVEMENTS OF REFORM AND REVOLUTION

A. Introduction

Discontent with the rule of the Czars was no new factor in Russian history: the massive Pugachev rebellion in the reign of Catherine II was but one of hundreds of revolts of peasants made desperate by the miserable condition of their lives. Revolts with a reformist political intention became more numerous in the nineteenth century, recruiting their participants largely from the Russian intelligentsia. The intelligentsia were a curiously distinct group; frustrated in their desire for outlets for their idealist energies they were driven by the extremism of a police state into adopting extreme political creeds which could inspire acts of great personal heroism, yet in fact rarely achieved anything positive. The opponents of Nicholas II were far from united, the divisions were foreshadowed in the nineteenth century when Bakunin (1814–76) saw hope only in the overthrow of all existing society, whilst P. N. Tkachev (1844–85) (a man much admired by Lenin) argued that revolution should be organised by a small conspiratorial group of professionals who would first seize power, and then transform society. But the most potent influence of all was the German philosopher Karl Marx. In 1872 *Das Kapital* was translated into Russian and his thinking influenced even respectable Liberals as well as extreme Social Democrats. Oddly, for years the

government permitted *Das Kapital* to circulate quite freely, apparently in the belief that it was simply a dry-as-dust treatise on economics.

B. The Liberals

The lack of a wealthy and numerous middle class made the Liberal party weak and ineffective. Russia's agricultural system had been based on nobles and peasantry, her industry was largely state financed (either directly, or through foreign loans). Thus the economic sources from which a Liberal Party could grow were insufficient. The *zemstvos* included a liberal wing which sought a central body for its regional organisations and demanded such reforms as equal rights for the peasantry, universal primary education, tax reforms, and the end of separate estates within the *zemstvos*. A second source of liberal support came from the *zemstvos* employees, teachers, doctors, etc., who formed unions and were soon to create 'a Union of Unions' to bind together their separate elements. A third source of liberal support came from some sections of the intelligentsia and included university staff, men like the historian Miliukov who lost his post at Moscow University for being a bad influence on his students. In January 1904 the different elements of liberalism linked themselves together in the Union of Liberation. But apart from their lack of numbers, they suffered also from their very principles, for the Czar was not willing to play the parliamentary game, and the peasantry were not interested in it, whilst calling in the aid of more extreme groups in order to bully the Czar would enhance the probability of reform getting out of hand and becoming revolution.

C. The Social Revolutionaries

A more extreme and more numerous group traced their descent from the *narodniks* of the 1860's (*narod* means 'people') who had been partially inspired by Herzen's demands for a society based on the peasantry, and who achieved fame, when their offshoot society, the People's Will, assassinated Czar Alexander II. At least the S.R.s were basing themselves on the most numerous groups in Russia, but though the S.R. party claimed to be a peasant

party, it consisted largely of students and other intelligentsia, and hardly at all of peasants.

The S.R.s did not form a tightly knit group; they met in 1900 to try and work out a common policy, but they never took kindly to party discipline and though they agreed that factories were to be co-operatives, and land was to be socialised, they differed on many other points. The extremists of the party believed in terror, and despite the persistent presence of police spies within its ranks the S.R. fighting organisation murdered a number of eminent people including the Ministers of Education and of the Interior. The first head of this group was Gregory Gershunin, he was later succeeded by Yevno Azev, a Jew and double agent, who, till 1909, managed to combine successful terrorism with the betrayal of fellow terrorists to the police. In 1902 a single S.R. party was formed, and some support won from peasants in areas where the communes were strong, for the S.R.s praised the communes as a basis on which to work. In areas where capitalism was well developed the S.R.s were less successful, but they remained attractive to students who were impressed by the opportunities for individual heroism which seemed to be offered by the party.

D. The Social Democrats

1. *Plekhanov.*

A consideration of anti-Czarist organisations in 1904, if made at the time, would have given the Social Democrats scant attention for they were a small group bitterly divided by ferocious doctrinal disputes.

The key figure in the early history of the Social Democrats of Russia was Plekhanov who, in the late 1870s broke away from the *narodniks*, was converted to Marxism, and founded the 'Liberation of Labour', a Russian Marxist group in Swiss exile. Although Plekhanov tended to be arrogant, intolerant of criticism, and doctrinaire, he nevertheless achieved a dominant position within the Russian Marxist party through the brilliance of his intellectual arguments and the success of his writings. These pamphlets included two of importance in 1884: 'Our Differences' and 'Society and the Political Struggle'. In

both of these he was concerned with attacking *narodnik* arguments in order to destroy the views of men like Mihailovski (who believed peasant life to be more balanced than that of the proletariat) and Danielson (who argued that capitalism was, in fact, impoverishing Russia and could develop no further). Plekhanov poured scorn on the idea of the peasantry as a revolutionary spearhead, to him the village commune was an anachronism. He believed that capitalism would soon upset the commune and that Russia would eventually follow the path of Britain and Germany and capitalism would obtain a dominant position in society. As a sound Marxist Plekhanov believed that political forms reflected the current stage of economic development, thus, as capitalism grew, so Russia would become a bourgeois, liberal democracy. Only when bourgeois democracy had been in control for some time would Russia be ripe for the second revolution when the proletariat would assume control.

Associated with Plekhanov were several other Russian exiles. The most eminent of these were Axelrod (who saw Marxism as a means of aiding suffering peoples rather than as a scientific principle), and Vera Zasulich (who had been acquitted by a sympathetic jury for shooting General Trepov, head of the St. Petersburg gendarmerie). Before long there were Marxist groups also inside Russia, though the origins of these are not clear. Possibly the earliest one was founded in St. Petersburg by the Bulgarian Blagoyev; at any rate there were several groups by 1898. A conference of them was organised in Minsk, and a programme drawn up by Peter Struve, but police action prevented further developments.

2. *Lenin.*

Two years before the Minsk Congress a Marxist group called the Union of Struggle for the Liberation of the Working Class had organised a strike in the capital. One of the members of this group was Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, better known as Lenin, and associated with him was his later rival, Julius Martov.

Lenin was born in 1870 in Simbirsk in the middle Volga region. His father was a physics teacher who rose to be

Director of Schools in Simbirsk Province, and his mother was a former school-teacher. At school he was noted for his industrious efforts, his clarity of thought and his conciseness of expression. He went on to study at the University of Kazan, but was expelled after four months along with other students involved in a riot. However, he continued his studies as an external student at St. Petersburg where he finally obtained his Law degree. Lenin soon became immersed in revolutionary activity, chiefly in the Marxist newspaper *Iskra*, which he edited jointly with Martov, Plekhanov, and Potresov, and which served as an organisational centre as well as a means of spreading propaganda and collecting information.

3. *The* 1903 *Congress.*

A Conference of Russian Marxists in Brussels was expelled by the police; it crossed to London and there continued a fierce debate about the party's future. There were 43 delegates at this Congress, and 14 other delegates without the power to vote. Lenin had already clashed with some of his comrades when discussions were held about the party programme: his views seemed too extreme to many and among his opponents was Martov.

During the discussions the gulf widened between Lenin and Martov on the issue of party organisation. Lenin sought a party made up of those who had previously participated in one of the party organisations. Martov preferred a wider grouping of those who would work under the control and guidance of one of the party organisations. The first debate on this issue produced a majority for Martov, but then the representatives of the Jewish Bund (the Jewish Workers' Union in Poland and Russia) left the congress, annoyed at its refusal to recognise the Bund as the exclusive representative for Jewish workers. This gave Lenin a majority and he hastened to adopt the title of 'Bolsheviks' (majority men) for his group, whilst Martov, a brilliant writer but not a skilful politician, allowed his followers to be burdened with the title of 'Mensheviks' (minority).

4. *The split in the Social Democratic Party.*

Plekhanov sided with Lenin on this issue, but he was

shocked by the ruthless way in which Lenin proposed to exploit his victory and soon deserted him. This meant that *Iskra* was in Bolsevik hands for only a very short time, and the Mensheviks were soon using it to abuse Lenin and accuse him of desiring to be a dictator. Lenin defended himself from this charge in his pamphlet "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back", and he accused the Mensheviks of being the heirs of earlier generations of 'gentlemen-anarchists'. In *What is to be Done?* he expounded his views that the party should consist of a small number of dedicated professionals, and that the ideas of the Economists (who believed that economic development would automatically bring power to the workers) were false. Lenin, perhaps inheriting the old *narodnik* emphasis on the 'criticially thinking individual', never followed the views to which many Mensheviks inclined about the working out of objective material forces. He believed that the workers needed intellectual leadership which would encourage them forward and organise them effectively. Bolsheviks and Mensheviks outside Russia remained distinct groups, though within Russia these distinctions were blurred and the wrangling that went on among exiled leaders baffled many of the proletariat who were interested in revolution. Lenin tried to establish a new paper, *Vpered*, and set up a central organisation. In 1905 the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks held separate party congresses and abused each other, the former arguing that Lenin was no Marxist in that he was conspiring to organise a proletarian revolt before conditions were ripe for it, the latter criticising the Mensheviks for thinking that the revolution was simply a process of historical development.

5. *Trotsky.*

One of Lenin's most violent opponents in the dispute over party organisation was Leon Bronstein Trotsky, a South Ukranian Jew who had grown up amid the bourgeoisie of Odessa after leaving his family's farm. Among the student discussion groups in which he so much revelled, Trotsky was known for his audacity as a speaker and for the warmth with which he discussed the future of

the Russian people. He was soon involved in a society to stir up trouble in the docks and factories and was sent to Siberia after a period in prison. But Trotsky was irrepressible, and in 1902 he escaped and made his way to London. During his exile in Siberia he had finally committed himself to Social Democracy and had abandoned his earlier *narodnik* leanings. In London he met the leading Social Democrats and was such a success that Plekhanov became jealous of him. Trotsky grew to be particularly friendly with Axelrod and Vera Zasulich, and it was possibly personal loyalties as much as doctrinal conviction that led him to support Martov, despite Lenin's efforts to win him over. Although Trotsky then attacked Lenin, accusing him of being a Jacobin eager to use a guillotine and seeking personal dictatorship, he did not, on the other hand, become firmly linked to the Mensheviks. Some Mensheviks did not find Trotsky's ideas agreeable, particularly Dan, a solid, pedestrian figure, and advocator of moderation and an alliance with bourgeois liberalism. Trotsky befriended Parvus, an eminent Russian Jew in German exile and a brilliant writer, and it was partly through his discussions with Parvus that Trotsky evolved his theory of permanent revolution. This theory differed from the views of Lenin and Martov in 1904; Trotsky came to believe that the proletariat could lead the revolution in its bourgeois stage, and, once in power, would have to move on to social revolution. This social revolution could not be successful without a similar movement throughout Europe.

6. *Stalin.*

The third key figure in the history of Communism, Stalin, was very insignificant in 1904. Stalin was the only one of the later party leaders who was really close to the bulk of the Russian people. His father was a Georgian peasant shoemaker and Stalin grew up in an atmosphere of squalor and poverty. His mother made considerable sacrifices in order to send him to school, and here he did well, showing considerable powers of memory and a tendency to self-assertiveness. Then he proceeded to a Theological Seminary at Tiflis. Here he studied Marxism

secretly, concealing his views from his tutors for some time before he was finally revealed as a revolutionary and expelled. His life was then devoted to underground activity; under the pseudonym of 'Koba' (the 'Indomitable') he sought to stir up trouble in Batum, but was caught and sent to Siberia. After escaping, Stalin became interested in the Lenin-Martov controversy. All his feelings inclined him towards Lenin for Stalin loathed weakness, vagueness and bourgeois dithering. He wrote articles defending the creation of a party of monolithic unity which would do something for the poor.

E. Conclusion

There was clearly no co-ordination or similarity of aims between the various groups hostile to Nicholas II. The Liberals seemed too few, the Social Revolutionaries were successful only in effecting assassinations, and the Social Democrats were divided by controversy. The Czar, however, blundered into a disastrous war which caused such discontent among the ordinary people that the revolutionaries, at last, had a promising situation to exploit. This was the Russo-Japanese conflict of 1904–5.

Books

Hill: *Lenin and the Russian Revolution*, chs. 2 and 3.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 18.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, ch. 3.
Carew-Hunt: *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, chs. 1 to 15, and 17.
Wolfe: *Three who made a Revolution*, chs. 2 to 14 and 13 to 17.
Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, chs. 1 and 2.
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, ch. 2.
Deutscher: *Stalin*, chs. 1 to 3.
Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed*, chs. 1 to 4.
Carr: *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. 1, chs. 1 and 2.
Kochan: *The Making of Modern Russia*, chs. 11 and 12.
Carr: *Bakunin*.
Berlin: *Karl Marx*.

Questions

1. "Liberalism in Russia was a hopeless cause". Discuss.
2. Outline the main differences in outlook between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks.
3. Who were the Social Revolutionaries? Why did they meet with so little success?
4. How did Trotsky's theory of 'permanent revolution' differ from the theories of other Marxists?
5. How justified were the Mensheviks in viewing success as eventually inevitable?

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR
1904-5

4. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

A. Introduction

The Crimean War had been followed by the concessions of Alexander II, to try and forestall trouble, but the inadequacy of the reforms and their subsequent modification only aroused disappointed bitterness. The Russo-Japanese War forced concessions from a reluctant Nicholas II and again the inadequate reforms were so truncated as to bring little support whilst arousing frustrated anger. That such anger should have been stirred by the war is ironical since the Minister of the Interior, Plehve, and possibly Nicholas himself, had hoped for a successful war in order to relieve tension at home. Plehve was, in fact, murdered in the disturbances that developed as the war pursued its futile course.

B. The Causes of the War

1. *Russian Expansion in the Far East.*

The Trans-Siberian Railway, constructed largely in the late 1890s, is evidence of an increasing Russian interest in the Far East. Witte inspired the construction of this astonishing railway, arguing that it would greatly assist the export of Siberian wheat and generally enable Russia to increase her share in the China trade. He also contended that it would help Russia to resist British penetration of the Far East and might lead to increased trade with the United States. The Russians were urged on by Kaiser William II who hoped to lure Nicholas away from his French alliance, or at least embroil him deeply in a region where German interests were less serious than in the Near East or Africa. This expansionist policy was almost bound to lead to trouble with Japan, but Nicholas had little affection for the Japanese, as heir he had been nearly murdered there by a Japanese secret society.

2. *The Sino-Japanese War*, 1894–5.

The Japanese sought to obtain control of, or at least influence over, part of the mainland, especially Korea. The Manchu rulers of China had lost their former greatness and had (unlike the Japanese) made no effort to master

Western technology. In 1894 the Japanese attacked, and easily overcame the antiquated Chinese armies. In the following year the Chinese were forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki which made Korea independent and gave Japan Formosa, the Pescadore Islands, and the Liaotung peninsula in Manchuria which included Port Arthur.

3. *How Russia obtained Port Arthur.*

This Japanese success did not please the Russian government, Port Arthur was a warm-water outlet that they coveted and, with German and French backing, they managed to bully Japan into returning the Liaotung Peninsula to China. The Russians also guaranteed the Chinese a loan with which to compensate Japan.

In 1896 the Russians followed this up with secret discussions with Li-Hung-chang, a Chinese statesman, as a result of which the two powers concluded a treaty giving the Trans-Siberian Railway the right to build a track across Manchuria to Vladivostock, thus avoiding the 600-mile Amur loop. Although this railway was called the Chinese Eastern Railway it was, in fact, controlled by Russia.

In 1897 further European land-grabbing at China's expense gave Kiaochow to Germany, and a 25 year lease on the Liaotung Peninsula to Russia, together with the right to link Port Arthur to the Trans-Siberian Railway.

It is hardly surprising that this news angered the Japanese. Witte feared that there might be war, especially since Nicholas's advisors included several bellicose individuals who urged the Czar on, advising him to exploit the Boxer Rising in 1900 in order to interfere further in China. The Russians occupied the chief cities of Manchuria and increased their forces in the railway zone.

4. *The Failure of Negotiations.*

Attempts by the Japanese to negotiate a settlement proved fruitless. Marshal Ito visited St. Petersburg and offered to recognise the Russian position in Manchuria in return for a free hand in Korea. But Nicholas wholly underestimated the Japanese and his Minister of the Interior advised him to be firm—though Plehve was

probably hoping to discredit his cautious rival, Witte, by advocating a bellicose attitude.

5. *Russian Interference in Korea.*

In Korea, a Russian adventurer, Bezobrazov, had obtained an interest in a timber concession on the Yalu river. Nicholas supported his plans for the virtual annexation of Korea and state funds reached the Yalu River Company. Bezobrazov was appointed to be Secretary for the Far East.

6. *The Outbreak of War.*

Since further offers of negotiation had been in vain the Japanese decided to strike the first blow in a war that they now regarded as inevitable. This blow took the form of a torpedo attack on the unprepared Russian Far East Fleet which lay at anchor in Port Arthur. But first the Japanese prepared the ground by completing the modernisation of her forces, and by signing a treaty in 1902 with Britain by which Britain would aid Japan in the event of her being involved in war with more than one power.

C. The Events of the War

1. *The State of Russian Forces.*

The Czar's aggressive policy had been based on ignorance of the facts about his armed forces. His troops were badly led and inferior in artillery, the Trans-Siberian Railway still only had a single track, its rolling stock was limited, and at Lake Baikal there was a 100-mile gap necessitating steamers or track laid on the ice in winter. The Japanese mobilised far more quickly, at sea they proved infinitely superior, whilst the nearest Russian centre of aid, Vladivostok, was a thousand miles away and ice-bound for much of the year. Moreover the Russian command was divided between the Viceroy, Admiral Alexeyev, and the army commander, Kuropatkin. These two men quarrelled about tactics, the former wishing to attack, and the latter to retreat; this difference led to frequent appeals to the distant, ill-advised, and ignorant Czar.

2. *The Defeat of Russia.*

The torpedo attack was a success and seriously damaged three Russian warships. After a clash between the two fleets, the Russians limped back to port where they suffered another torpedo attack. To protect themselves from this menace, a recent addition to modern warfare, the Russians laid mines across the entrance to Port Arthur. However, this meant that though the Japanese could not sail in, the Russians could not sail out of the port, and thus the Japanese supply lines were able to operate quite freely. When a more energetic leader, Admiral Makarov, started clearing the harbour with a view to action, disaster came when his flagship, the 'Peter and Paul', struck a mine and exploded, killing the Admiral.

On land the Russians fought with their customary tough obstinacy, but the Japanese were better equipped and inspired by almost fanatical fervour. Kuropatkin's struggles to give coherence to his scattered forces were not aided by the activities of General Zasulich, who launched an attack without permission, was heavily defeated and driven back, and thus allowed the Japanese to cut the railway to Port Arthur. The garrison of 55,000 was now isolated and was subject to repeated attacks from the Japanese forces who landed at Dalny, 12 miles from Port Arthur.

Poor leadership led to further disasters at sea. Admiral Witholf failed to exploit a favourable situation resulting from the sinking of two Japanese battleships by mines, he cruised aimlessly before returning to port. On putting to sea again he found that his opponents were now better prepared and the Russian Far East Fleet was shattered by Admiral Togo's force. A scattered remnant of it escaped to Port Arthur or neutral ports, but Witholf himself was killed, and Japanese sea control was complete.

Though the Trans-Siberian Railway was now giving better service in bringing up men and supplies, a steady retreat on land continued. In September, 1904, Kuropatkin launched a heavy counter attack with a force of 220,000 against a Japanese army of 160,000. This encounter, the battle of the Sha River, proved costly to both

sides, but it was the Japanese who were able to claim victory.

After this Alexeyev was recalled, leaving Kuropatkin in a better position to assert his authority. Nicholas also decided to send the Baltic Fleet to the Far East in a bid to recover sea control. In October, 1904, it set off on its long voyage, commanded by Rozhdestvensky, but it had only reached the Dogger Bank when it nearly provoked a crisis by firing on an English fishing fleet which it mistook for hostile torpedo boats. Prompt apologies averted trouble, however.

As the Baltic Fleet made its laborious way east, Port Arthur fell to the Japanese, surrendered by General Stoessel in very dubious circumstances. A further battle at Mukden, lasted nearly two weeks. Though Kuropatkin had a bigger force he was beaten again by the more skilful Japanese, and resigned his command which was taken over by Linevich.

Undermanned, and creaking at the seams, the Baltic Fleet finally arrived in the East. But as it attempted to sail through the Straits of Tsushima to reach Vladivostok, it was attacked by Admiral Togo. The battle was brief; four of the Russian battleships were sunk and the rest captured; seven of the twelve cruisers and five of the nine destroyers were also sunk.

D. The Treaty of Portsmouth

This was the final humiliation, and coupled with the violent internal unrest was enough to make Nicholas sue for peace.

Witte was given the task of negotiating a treaty. The negotiations were in the U.S.A. at Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Witte had the sympathetic support of the U.S.A. in his dealings with Komura (the Japanese Foreign Minister) and Takahira (Minister in Washington). Witte was a skilful negotiator, and the Japanese economy had been seriously disrupted by the war and thus he obtained quite favourable terms:

(i) Russia conceded Japanese hegemony in Korea.

(ii) Russia gave Japan half the island of Sakhalin.

(iii) Russia gave Japan the Liaotung Peninsula.
(iv) Witte refused claims for an indemnity and rejected any limitation over Russia's right to keep naval forces in the Far East.

This treaty was finally signed in September, 1905.

E. The Far East after 1905

In the following years relations with Japan improved. The French, who loaned the Japanese money in 1907 put pressure on them to co-operate with Russia, and common hostility to the American demand for an open door in Chinese trade also drew them together. In 1911 the Russian position there improved when Russia exploited the Chinese revolution (which overthrew the Manchus) in order to establish a protectorate over Outer Mongolia.

Books

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 6.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 20.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, ch. 5.
Woodward: 'The Russian Armada 1904–5', *History Today*, February, 1953.
Platonov: 'The Battle of Mukden', *History Today*, December, 1955.

Questions

1. Could Russia have avoided defeat in the Russo-Japanese War?
2. What were the causes of the Russo-Japanese War? Outline its effect on subsequent Russian foreign policy, 1905–14.

5. THE REVOLUTION OF 1905

A. The Growth of Discontent

As an attempt to divert attention from internal discontents, the war was an utter failure; in fact it had the reverse effect and aggravated the discontent to the point of spontaneous revolt. The opening of the war saw a brief truce in the conflict between the government and the Liberals, but the harsh, uncompromising attitude of Plehve soon ended this truce. Plehve obstructed the *zemstvos'*

efforts to aid the sick, the wounded, and the families of troops killed in the war with Japan, he even refused to confirm the election of the highly respectable Shipov as chairman of the Moscow provincial board.

The war made no difference to the hostility of parties more extreme than the Liberals. The S.R. had for some time singled out Plehve for attention, in 1904 they attempted in vain to assassinate him. On July 5th, 1905, they were more successful, a student, Egor Sazanov, threw a bomb which killed the Minister of the Interior. The S.R. claimed another eminent victim in the same year, Bobrikov, the dictator of Finland was assassinated by the son of a Finnish senator.

B. The Ministry of Sviatopolk-Mirsky

1. *The Failure of his Reforms.*

The Czar made a half-hearted attempt to conciliate public opinion by appointing Prince Paul Sviatopolk-Mirsky as Minister of the Interior. Sviatopolk-Mirsky's attitude was more enlightened than Plehve's had been and he permitted a relaxation of tension by abolishing corporal punishment for peasants and allowing some political exiles to return to Russia. As usual, though, such concessions were too few and too late.

2. *The Organisation of the Left.*

The Liberal leader, Miliukov, exasperated by the government's attitude, had formulated a new (and dangerous) policy of trying to use the revolutionary parties to create a disturbance sufficient to obtain real reform. His slogan 'no enemy on the left' was regarded with alarm by some liberals, but Miliukov went ahead and organised a conference with the S.R. leaders Chernov and Azev, and with representatives of the discontented in Poland, Finland, Latvia, Georgia and Armenia. The reforms demanded by this conference indicate the varied nature of opposition to the Czar. They included a free democratic system, universal suffrage (which reflected Liberal wishes) and national self-determination (as demanded by the subject nationalities). Liberal agitation mounted, the Union of Unions was formed by the various branches of professional

men who worked for the *zemstvos*, banquets were held and meetings arranged.

Yet Nicholas remained intransigent, abruptly turning down Sviatopolk-Mirsky's request for a reform of the State Council so as to include *zemstvos* representatives in it. The Liberals were clearly ineffective, their numerical inferiority, their exclusion from positions of real power in the government and economy, made them reliant upon other forces to create a situation which they could exploit. The Czar's mismanagement of the Russo-Japanese War provided the Liberals with just such a situation.

C. Bloody Sunday

1. *The Association of Factory and Mill Workers.*

The news of the fall of Port Arthur reached the capital at a time when the Association of Factory and Mill Workers was organising a strike in the Putilov metal works. This association belonged to that curious group of unions which were founded with police connivance in order to remove control of the workers from the hands of the revolutionaries. It had been sanctioned by Plehve, and assisted by police funds and it was led by a priest, Father George Gapon. But Gapon was by no means a mere police agent, though rather vain and unstable, he was interested in social reform and was an able orator.

2. *The Events, January 22nd,* 1905.

His union sought to obtain an 8-hour working day and a minimum wage. The strike it was leading spread to other works, fanned by the disastrous news from the Far East, and Gapon was persuaded to give expression to the workers' feelings by leading a demonstration to the Winter Palace in order to hand over a petition. The demonstration was intended as a peaceful protest. The petition requested an end to the war, full civil liberties, a constituent assembly, a political amnesty, universal education, an end to indirect taxes, and a graduated income tax. Despite warnings from the police, large numbers of demonstrators gathered and marched through the snow in five columns, Gapon at their head. The police barred the way to the Winter Palace, however, and, alarmed by

the size of the demonstration, opened fire, killing many of the marchers.

3. *The Results.*

The official casualty list of 'Bloody Sunday' totalled 130 dead (a conservative estimate) and it is hardly surprising that the massacre released the pent-up feelings of the Russian people. Despair at their miserable conditions of life, anger at the failure of Russian forces in the war, indignation at the slaughter outside the Winter Palace, all these feelings mingled together to be expressed in strikes and demonstrations. The universities closed themselves, a fresh wave of S.R. terrorism brought the death of the Grand Duke Sergei Alexandrovich (killed by a student Kaliayev) and Nicholas reluctantly agreed to a meeting of a representative assembly. Yet even now he sought to concede as little as possible, the assembly was to have consultative functions only. This outraged most Russians and the Liberals were able to place themselves at the head of a demand for a constituent assembly, chosen by universal suffrage in elections that were direct, equal, and secret. Nicholas's hand was forced by the final defeat of his forces at Tsushima. His police chief, Trepov, proved quite unable to master the violence, riots, strikes, mutinies and terrorism that engulfed Russia. In Odessa there was a general strike, serious fighting broke out in Lodz, and the 'Potemkin' (the newest battleship in the Black Sea fleet) mutinied and hoisted the red flag.

D. The Bulygin Project

The Czar replaced Sviatopolk Mirsky by Bulygin and the new minister devised what he thought to be a solution to the crisis. He proposed that a State *Duma* should be called able to discuss all new laws and able to present its conclusions—via the State Council—to the Czar. This duma was to be elected largely by the peasants (who were thought to be more loyal to the Czar) in the towns the franchise was to be hedged about with property qualifications.

But the Bulygin Project seemed to make little impression on the people, and as a general strike spread from a

Moscow printing works all over Russia, Nicholas, in panic, turned once more to Witte.

E. Witte and the October Manifesto

Witte had connections with the Liberals, he was also the man most able to raise the huge loans Russia would soon be needing to aid her recovery. Whilst Nicholas sought the help of Witte, St. Petersburg workers began to organise themselves; a *soviet* (workers' council) was formed which, though hastily improvised at first from representatives of factory workers, began to win considerable local prestige for itself.

1. *The October Manifesto.*

Witte was no lover of democracy; Russia's size and difficulties, he thought, would be best solved by enlightened despotism. But since there seemed no hope of Nicholas II ever fulfilling the key rôle, he was forced to conclude that some form of real parliamentary rule must be established. His ideas were embodied in the October Manifesto which proclaimed

(i) that Russians would be free from arbitrary arrest.
(ii) that they would be permitted liberty of conscience, speech, meeting and association.
(iii) he promised to alter the franchise proposed by the Bulygin Project so as to make it more democratic.
(iv) the assembly (the Duma) that was to meet would have the power of voting on legislation, without its consent no law would be valid.

This Manifesto proved effective in splitting the opposition, the moderate liberals became separated from the extremists, for though the Liberals were suspicious of the Manifesto, they were ready to allow it a trial. The extremists, however, denounced the whole scheme. Their attitude can be illustrated from Trotsky's articles in *Izvestia* (the news sheet of the St. Petersburg Soviet) in which he poured scorn equally upon Trepov, the police thug, and Witte, the Liberal shark.

The Liberals formed the Constitutional Democrat Party (better known as the Cadets) for the purpose of contesting the Duma elections. The party was an alliance of Miliukov's

Union of Liberation, the *zemstvos*, and the Union of Unions. But they were faced by an implacable foe, the Union of the Russian People led by Dubrovin and Purishkievich, a right wing party with a fiercely anti-Jewish policy that was connected with the 'Black Hundreds', gangs who organised counter demonstrations and murdered Jews—often with police connivance.

2. *The Collapse of the Soviet.*

The end of the St. Petersburg *Soviet* removed a further enemy from the path of the government as it sought to recover control of the country. The *Soviet* had already been discredited by its failure to break an employers' lock-out and enforce its policy of an 8-hour working day. In its last days, with Trotsky as its president, the *Soviet* called in vain for the Russian people to put pressure on the government by refusing to pay taxes and by withdrawing savings. There was no serious protest when troops finally dispersed the meeting of the *Soviet*.

3. *Witte's Rural Policy.*

In the countryside Witte found that his October Manifesto had little effect and conciliation was necessary to counter the S.R.'s efforts to create a Peasants' Union. The redemption payments for 1906 were halved, payments from January 1907 were abolished. This did not placate the Peasants' Union, though, it demanded the transfer of land to the peasants under state ownership.

4. *The end of the revolt.*

The 1905 revolution spluttered to an end in isolated outbreaks of discontent. In Sepastopol the cruiser *Ochakov* was taken over by revolutionaries and had to be shelled. A strike in St. Petersburg failed, and an armed rising in Moscow was put down. The bulk of the Russian people waited to see what kind of progress would be made by the Duma.

In the outlying provinces, and especially in Finland, there had been violence, strikes and demonstrations. Nicholas allowed Finland to have a Diet which was to be elected for three years by universal suffrage (including votes for women). The one subject people for whom the revolution brought nothing but misery was the Jews. Pogroms

occurred in many cities, notably Odessa, where the Black Hundreds killed 300 Jews. The Jews formed a league to win full rights, some worked with the Cadets, but many became prominent in the S.D. party—useful "evidence" for a later Nazi massacre of Jews whom thay claimed were dangerous revolutionaries.

Books

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 7.
Hill: *Lenin and the Russian Revolution*, ch. 5.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, chs. 20 and 21.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, ch. 4.
Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ch. 3.
Carr: *The Bolshevik Revolution*, Vol. 1, ch. 3.
Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed*, chs. 5 and 6.
Deutscher: *Stalin*, ch. 3.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, ch. 6.

Questions

1. Account for the failure of the extreme revolutionaries to obtain their aims in the 1905 Revolution.
2. What were the consequences, in Russia, of defeat in the war with Japan?
3. Why did Nicholas II permit the October Manifesto? How serious was he in conceding it?

6. THE RETURN OF REACTION

A. The First Duma

1. *The Czar's change in attitude.*

The concessions allowed by the Czar had been given reluctantly, and when the fury of the revolution began to wane, the Czar regretted the reforms that he had permitted Witte to proclaim. He sought to reduce the concessions he had made, and did his best to encourage the reactionaries. A newly appointed Minister of the Interior, Durnovo, a fierce reactionary, savagely suppressed disorder, whilst the rest of the government was largely recruited from old-school bureaucrats. Part of the blame for this may lie with the Liberals whose determination to give the Duma the authority of a Western parliament made a clash with

the Czar inevitable. Miliukov would not co-operate with Witte, and rejected his offer of ministerial posts for some of his group.

2. *The Arrangements for the Duma.*

The *Duma*, once elected, was to last for five years. The elections were elaborately organised:

(i) Landlords voted at county level to choose their delegates.

(ii) Peasants voted in a series of indirect stages at canton, county, and provincial level.

(iii) Factory workers suffered so many disabilities as to be almost disenfranchised.

If the system worked as intended, the *Duma* members would be drawn from sources thought to be reliable, 42 per cent from the peasantry, 31 per cent from the landowners, 27 per cent from the towns.

Although the *Duma* was allowed to initiate legislation, its powers were restricted by a number of factors.

(i) It had to share power with a State Council that, although reorganised to include representatives of Church, nobles, trade, industry, universities, and *zemstvos*, was designed to be hostile to reform.

(ii) The budget rules excluded from the *Duma*'s competence the right to control military estimates, court expenditure, and state debts.

(iii) By Article 87 the Czar was allowed to issue decrees when the *Duma* was not in session.

(iv) The Czar added to the feeling of betrayal by issuing a new Fundamental Law which asserted "to the Emperor of all the Russians belongs supreme power". He declared that the Czar alone could make war or peace, dissolve the *Duma*, or appoint ministers, and that ministers were to be responsible to the Czar, not the *Duma*.

3. *The Dismissal of Witte.*

Having ridden out the storm of 1905, Nicholas now dismissed the pilot. Witte had served his purpose, the threat of civil war had faded out and a massive French

loan of 2½ million francs had been successfully negotiated. In his place was installed Goremykin, elderly, lazy, cynical, ready to obey the Czar and ignore the *Duma*. In his own curious fashion Nicholas seemed to blame Witte for being so useful to him, the Empress and some of his more irresponsible advisors like Trepov (whom Witte had removed as Governor General of St. Petersburg) sought to poison the Czar's mind against the chief minister. In any case, the Czar had long since tired of Witte, and had installed him in office only because even he had realised that military dictatorship would be risky since loyal troops were few. The chosen instrument of military dictatorship, the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaivitch, had flatly refused to co-operate and had even threatened to shoot himself if Nicholas did not give way and allow the October Manifesto. Moreover Nicholas had a new 'strong man' in the government, Peter Stolypin, Minister of the Interior. For the moment Nicholas was impressed with this man's obvious ability.

Clearly there was little hope of the *Duma* satisfying the extreme parties now there seemed small expectation of the more moderate groups being satisfied.

4. *The Results of the Election.*

The elections produced a majority for the Cadets and their allies (179 seats). The Trudoviks (a Labour group) obtained 94 seats, the S.D.s 18, the Octobrists (a group of liberal bureaucrats and business men in favour of trying to work with the government and hostile to the Cadet policy of breaking up large estates) obtained 17, and Right Wing groups won 15 seats. The S.R.s boycotted the elections, and so, at first, did the S.D.s, hence the election of the large number of Trudoviks who filled the gap left by the absence of the more extreme parties. Most of the Trudoviks were S.R. in sympathy. In April, 1906, an S.D. congress of Bolsheviks and Mensheviks had been busy arguing about the question of an armed uprising. Many Bolsheviks denounced the *Duma* as a fraud and the group took no part in the elections, but at the last minute the Mensheviks contested the Caucasus region and secured their representation there. Curiously, Lenin had been in

favour of intervention in these elections, but had accepted the views of the Bolshevik majority.

5. *The Meeting of the first Duma.*

The assembled *Duma* proceeded to elect a Cadet, Muromtsev, as its president, and to adopt the Cadet programme of reforms as its policy. But it was able to achieve nothing positive. Goremykin declared that none of its demands would be met, and, on the excuse of a proclamation issued by the *Duma* to defend its agricultural policy, Nicholas dissolved it. The Cadets and Trudoviks went to Vyborg in Finland and issued the 'Vyborg appeal', making demands on the Russian people similar to the demands made by the Soviet. But the people ignored the request to refuse to pay taxes or provide army recruits till the *Duma* was restored. The Czar now promoted Peter Stolypin to be chairman of the council of ministers, the troublesome Baltic provinces were fiercely suppressed by General Orlov, and government officials suspected of liberal sympathies were dismissed.

B. Stolypin

1. *His Repressive Policy.*

For the moment the Chief Minister had the Czar's support, but before long his readiness to work with the *Duma* had made him suspect of Liberalism, whilst the success of his economic policies aroused the Czar's jealousy. Stolypin had come to the fore as governor of Saratov, an area where there were violent agricultural disturbances which he had successfully crushed. Though ready to work with the *Duma*, his policy towards extremists was ruthless. He used Article 87 with a freedom that did not endear him to the Cadets. Forceful measures were needed, for a new wave of terrorism had broken out, in August, 1906, there was even an attempt on Stolypin's life, organised by Solomon Ryss. There were many 'expropriations' raids by revolutionary societies to obtain party funds—including a particularly daring one outside a bank in St. Petersburg, again organised by Ryss. Stolypin gave special powers to the provincial governors to dispense justice through field courts-martial which could try and sentence suspects

within 24 hours; he also tried to use spies, informers, and agents provocateurs.

2. *The Second Duma.*

Elections were held for a second *Duma*. The government hampered the Cadets and assisted the right wing Union of the Russian People, the result was a strengthening of the parties on the extremes for the revolutionaries had decided to intervene. The elections produced 92 Cadets, 101 Trudoviks, 65 S.D.s, 34 S.R.s, 32 Octobrists, and 63 Right Wingers. But the *Duma* lasted only $3\frac{1}{2}$ months, then Stolypin declared that S.D. plots to murder the Czar necessitated the arrest of their deputies, and the *Duma* was dissolved.

3. *The Third Duma.*

Drastic electoral reform preceded the meeting of the third *Duma*, the representation of non-Russian peoples, and of urban workers and professional classes, was cut. Even the peasantry were allowed only $22\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of the total electorate, whilst 50 per cent came from the landowning class. One elector was allowed per 125,000 workers; the number of landowners empowered to choose an elector was 230. Thus a *Duma* was produced that contained 154 Octobrists, 127 Right Wingers, 54 Cadets, and 33 Left Wingers. The Octobrists believed in caution, in not pressing for the full parliamentary rights that Miliukov demanded, but they were not servile—as Finance Minister Kokovtsev realised when the *Duma* raged against his assertion, "Thank God we have no parliament yet." This *Duma* had a longer history, Stolypin sought to co-operate with it in his economic reforms, but Nicholas took little notice of it and relied primarily on advisors who were to be found at court.

Books

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 8.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 21.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, ch. 5.
Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ch. 5.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, chs. 8 and 9.

Questions

1. "Parliamentary government would never have worked in Russia, it was simply not a suitable form of government for solving Russia's problems." Discuss this comment with reference to the Dumas.

2. Describe the part played by Witte in rescuing Nicholas II from the 1905 Revolution.

7. STOLYPIN'S ECONOMIC POLICY

A. The Difficulties of his position

Stolypin hoped to provide a basis of support for the régime by seeking to assist the *Kulaks* (the richer peasants), he could not possibly solve the land hunger of the whole peasantry and he remained an enemy to the poor. His policy was hampered by the right wing groups who disliked the way Stolypin backed the chief procurator of the Orthodox Church, Lukianov, in his campaign to end abuses and scandals in the Church. In particular, Lukianov sought to check the activities of the notorious monk Iliodor, the editor of a violently abusive anti-Jewish paper, *Listock*. Stolypin provoked further resentment by his plan to extend the *zemstvos* to the Western provinces. The State Council objected to his scheme because he sought to favour the Russian peasantry and officials, and not the Polish landowners and it was with difficulty that Nicholas was persuaded to force the measure through and thus weaken the influence of nobles over peasantry.

B. Laws Helping the Kulaks

Stolypin introduced a number of stop-gap measures to ease land hunger,

(i) Lands belonging to members of the imperial family (the appanage lands) were transferred to the Peasants' Bank.

(ii) Emigration to Siberia was encouraged.

But the chief part of his policy was centred on ways of helping the Kulaks, and laws to effect this were issued on October 18th, 1906.

(i) New regulations on the personal rights of peasants

allowed them to choose their own *zemstvos* representatives instead of allocating this task to the provincial governor.

(ii) The collective responsibility of the commune for taxes was abolished.

(iii) The commune's power to make the peasant do forced labour was abolished.

(iv) Peasants were permitted to leave one commune without joining another.

On November 22nd a further batch of laws dealt with the tenure and reallocation of land.

(i) A peasant living in a region where there had been no re-distribution of land since 1882 was now entitled to demand separate and permanent title to all the strips in his possession.

(ii) A peasant living in a region where such a re-distribution had taken place could claim all the land he held before that redistribution, and might receive land that he had subsequently obtained if he paid the commune the original redemption price for the land.

C. How the Reform Worked

Between 1906 and 1915 around three to five million peasants applied for permission to secede from their communes in this way.

Secession alone, however, was not an adequate solution, for in the backward Russian farming system, many owned their lands in scattered strips and could not obtain a compact farm. Stolypin therefore had to encourage the consolidation of holdings. A process began which, though less comprehensive, was rather like the enclosure movement that transformed that area of England still using the three-field system. England experienced this in the late 18th century, Russia had to wait until the 20th century. It was made easier to obtain the commune's consent to the creation of a compact holding, and permission was given to divide common pasture and meadow land too.

The process of consolidation was supervised by Land Organisation Commissions which, till 1911, could only give decisions when their aid was invited. After 1911 they could interfere without being invited to do so. These commissions existed at different levels:

(*a*) The district commissions, containing three or four members chosen by the peasants and nine or ten elected by the authorities on the *zemstvos*.

(*b*) The provincial commissions, half of the *zemstvos* members on this (a minority overall) had to be peasants.

It is estimated that by 1915 10 per cent of the holdings in European Russia had been consolidated. The communes were, as a result, weakened, for groups of *kulaks* emerged owning buildings that stood on their own farms. They were known as the 'hutors'. Other *kulaks* continued to live in the village, although they had managed to gather together a compact farm.

But the farming methods remained antiquated, a severe check on increased productivity. There were few iron ploughs. It was common for peasants to be dependent on other earnings to supplement their living from the land. In any case Stolypin had no solution for the poor peasants, his policy was designed to win the allegiance of the strong and intelligent. But the *kulaks* constituted only 15 per cent of the peasantry.

D. The Death of Stolypin, 1911

After four years the Czar had lost all trust in his chief minister. Perhaps Stolypin might have saved Czarist rule by winning agricultural *kulak* allegiance and increasing productivity, whilst dealing firmly with disorder. Perhaps something might have come out of his readiness to try and work with the *Duma*. But Stolypin was murdered, shot whilst attending an opera in a theatre in Kiev. His murderer was Bogrov, one of the many revolutionaries who were also police spies. The whole episode remained cloaked in an air of mystery which suggested that the police had been at least indirectly implicated in the death of the Chief Minister.

Books

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 8.
Hill: *Lenin and the Russian Revolution*, ch. 4.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, ch. 9.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 21.

Questions

1. Stolypin described his economic policy as being 'for the sober and the strong'. Was this policy primarily economic or political in intention?
2. How successful was Stolypin's economic policy in achieving its aims?

8. RASPUTIN AND THE YEARS 1911–14

A. Rasputin

Though the years that followed the death of Stolypin were critical for the future of Czarist rule and for Russia's role as a powerful, Westernised State, Nicholas made little effort to guide his state, or to reorganise its internal affairs so as to produce a dictatorship that was at least competent and efficient. Instead Russia was allowed to drift for much of the time. Indeed, worse was to come, for the course steered by the Czar was increasingly affected by the whims of Rasputin whose influence brought the imperial family into increasing disrepute whilst influencing administration so as to promote the most pliable and least competent. Rasputin was a *staret*, a wandering 'holy' man, illiterate and coarse, but shrewd, and with a powerful magnetism that brought some success to his gospel of redemption through sin. Not only did he gain a following in the Church, he was taken up by fashionable female society and was brought to the notice of the Czarina herself.

The Czarina was neurotic and superstitious. Her obsession with the health of her haemophilic son had already led her to be deceived by Philippe, a quack French doctor. Now she fell under Rasputin's spell, for Rasputin seemed able to check the boy's bleeding. His rise to power can be seen in the appointment of Sable, one of his associates, as Chief Procurator, and in the ruin of the arrogant

Minister of the Interior, Makarov, for failing to check the anti-Rasputin articles that appeared in the press. Even the Right Wing leaders were horrified at Rasputin's rise and tried in vain to persuade the Czar to exile him. For a time Stolypin had checked Rasputin's influence, but after Stolypin's death Rasputin's power increased. In January, 1914, he was able to cause the dismissal of the chief minister, an able bureaucrat called Kokovtsev and to secure, in his place, the return of Goremykin. Like Witte, Kokovtsev had served his purpose by securing a French loan of 500 million francs annually for five years to finance the building of railways of strategic value in the West (November, 1913).

B. The Continuation of Discontent

As the Czar withdrew into privacy at Tsarskoe Selo, trouble continued to flare up periodically, the most dramatic event was a strike in the Lena oilfield in which 200 demonstrators were killed by troops. The Land Reforms of Stolypin were continued by Krivoshein, a shrewd flatterer and an able Minister of Agriculture, and the *zemstvos* continued to work hard to build up the educational system despite the reactionary attitude of Kasso, Minister for Education, whose clumsy and fierce intrusions into university affairs brought about the resignation of 100 staff members of Moscow University (including the eminent historians Kliuchevsky and Vinogradoff). The Russian economy recovered well from the shock of 1904–5, foreign loans assisted the metallurgical and mining industries in particular and the currency remained stable.

But the growth of industry meant also the growth of the proletariat. The few concessions allowed by the government were insufficient, free schooling from 8 to 11 years old, health and accident insurance (paid for by workers and employers for health and by employers for accident) and legalised unions in 1906. Strikes remained illegal and public meetings were banned. It was obvious to the proletariat that a modified political system was necessary if conditions were to improve.

C. The 4th Duma

The *Duma* certainly did not offer any kind of vigorous leadership for political life. The 3rd *Duma* ended in May, 1912, and the elections were preceded by further rigging to favour landowners and by the creation of a special electoral college for clergy. The result was a strengthening of the extreme right. Such reforms as the *Duma* did initiate were usually rejected or mutilated by the State Council; only once did the Council give full approval to a law proposed on the *Duma*'s initiative.

D. The Treatment of the Nationalities

The government was storing up further trouble for itself by a policy of Russification in the outer regions, new Russian provinces were created from Polish land, for example. Persecution of Jews was maintained, the Beilis case showed up the policy of trying to divert criticism from the government to the Jews, when the trial of a Jew, Beilis, for the murder of a 13 year old boy in Kiev, brought up evidence of official instigation of rumours and corruption of witnesses. Beilis was acquitted.

Thus the government sought to return to its old ways. Though the *Duma* continued to function, though industries grew and the urban proletariat increased, the Czar and his entourage remained isolated from political and economic reality whilst extremist revolutionaries hopefully plotted their overthrow.

Books

Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 22.
Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, ch. 10.
Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 8.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution* (ch. 5 gives colourful details of Rasputin).
Miller: *The Economic Development of Russia*, 1905–14.

Questions

1. Account for the remarkable success of Rasputin's career. How did he affect the position of imperial rule in Russia?

9. THE REVOLUTIONARIES, 1905–14

A. Their part in the 1905 revolution

1. *The Soviet.*

The 1905 revolution (like the February 1917 revolution) found the revolutionary leaders unprepared. The only leader to achieve a key position was Trotsky, who served, briefly, as President of the St. Petersburg Soviet. This Soviet was probably not the first in Russia, that privilege seems to belong to the factory town of Ivanov-Voznesenk, but it was obviously of greater importance and it contained Social Democrats. Trotsky replaced Khrustalev-Nosar, the first president, he wrote most of the Soviet's manifestos, edited *Izvestya* and tried to restrain the Soviet from over-rash action.

The revolution produced a period of relative amity between Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, perhaps partly because Lenin was struggling with a wing of his own faction, led by Bogdanov and Lunacharsky, who tried to reconcile socialism with religion.

2. *Lessons learned from the* 1905 *revolution.*

The revolution was as important for the conclusions drawn from it by the socialist leaders as for their part in the actual revolt.

(i) Trotsky (in prison with time to reflect) evolved the theory of 'permanent revolution'. In *Results and Prospects* he contended that the events of 1905 had clearly demonstrated the feeble nature of the bourgeoisie in Russia: they could hardly flourish in a situation in which most capital for industry came from the State or from foreign investors. The bourgeoisie would, therefore, be incapable of successfully carrying through their revolution, they would need workers' support and the workers could not be expected to take a decisive part in a revolution only to hand over the spoils of victory to bourgeois capitalists. Instead of two distinct revolutions, Trotsky contended that the first, 'bourgeois' revolution would continue into the proletariat revolution; European support for this would make it triumphant.

(ii) Lenin's views were less clear. Certainly the revolution brought home to him the importance of attracting peasant support—a factor that till now he had largely ignored. He made out a case for this in *Two Tactics of Social Democrats in a Democratic Revolution*, and he seems to have expected a two-stage process. The richer peasants, having seized land for themselves, would desert the revolution, therefore the poor and landless peasants would have to be used against the rich. These ideas are interesting in view of Stolypin's deliberate policy of trying to lure over the *kulaks* by his economic policy; and the method of using poor peasants was adopted, at times, by the Bolsheviks when they obtained power. On Trotsky's 'permanent revolution' theories Lenin's thoughts were not definite; he certainly believed that the proletariat might be involved. Although Lenin's and Trotsky's ideas were more akin to each other than to the Mensheviks', their different attitudes on party organisation still kept them apart.

B. 1906–14

1. *The Continued Split of the S.D. Party.*

An S.D. Congress in 1906 brought together Bolsheviks and Mensheviks only to demonstrate their differences. It was evident that the Mensheviks' policy was to arouse the workers by political education to be eventually ready for a mass revolution: the Bolsheviks thought in terms of an insurrection led and organised by an elite, and Lenin sneered at the Mensheviks as 'Liquidators'.

Even fiercer differences emerged over the policy of expropriations which the S.D. party had denounced, but which Bolsheviks continued to organise in order to finance the funds of their faction. In 1907 a particularly daring bank robbery took place in Tifis, carried out by Kamo and partly organised by Stalin. Much of the money found its way back to the police but the Mensheviks were enraged by it.

2. *The Prague Congress of* 1912.

In January, 1912, at Prague, a Bolshevik Congress

made it clear that the S.D. split was open. A purely Bolshevik central committee was appointed which included Stalin, rewarded thus for his loyal service. The split was reflected by a split in the S.D. *Duma* members, who had hitherto co-operated, the leader of the Bolshevik members was Malinovski. This man was shortly after revealed to be a police spy, in this way the police had hoped to weaken the S.D. party. Indeed evidence emerged that they had been assisting Lenin's faction in various ways. In 1912, for instance, they had arrested three delegates hostile to him who were going to the party conference. It was the police themselves who revealed that Malinovsky was on their pay-roll to revenge themselves for the increasingly violent tone of that delegate's speeches.

3. *S.R. Difficulties.*

The S.R. party was rocked by a similar scandal; the head of its Fighting Unit, Azev, was also found to be a police spy. Azev's career was particularly baffling for he had betrayed one plot to murder Plehve, yet he participated in the successful murder that was carried out.

4. *Bolshevik Difficulties.*

Bolshevik funds were further swelled by an inheritance and a gift from a wealthy merchant, this helped the party to establish a newspaper, *Pravda* (the title was stolen from a paper run by an indignant Trotsky) the paper proved useful for building an organisation in Russia as well as for propaganda. These years were difficult ones for the Bolsheviks. The more moderate Menshevik attitude seemed better suited to the new situation that was emerging in Russia with the old gulf between peasant and Czar being partially filled by the *Dumas*, with the *kulaks* being favoured by Stolypin, and with the skilled workers organised in unions, however feeble. It was the huge disasters of the 1914–17 war that saved the situation for Lenin, reducing Russia to suffering and despair, opening up a massive gulf between those who had taken the country into the war and those compelled to fight for a cause they did not care for, and thus creating the kind of situation that could be exploited by an organised group of unscrupulous men.

Books

Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 22.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, ch. 6.
Wolfe: *Three Who made a Revolution*, chs. 15 to 22, and 29 to 36.
Deutscher: *Stalin*, chs. 3 and 4.
Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed*, ch. 7.
Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, chs. 3 to 7.
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, ch. 2.
Carr: *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 1, ch. 3.
Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 8.

Questions

1. Discuss the balance of pro- and anti-Czarist forces in 1914.
2. "But for the 1914 war the Communists would never have attained power in Russia." Does the situation on the eve of the war support this comment?

10. RUSSIA AND THE FIRST WORLD WAR

A. Events leading up to the War

1. *The French Alliance.*

A confused tangle of events dragged a far from bellicose Russia into war in 1914. The Russians were already committed to a French alliance, yet they did not feel particularly hostile towards Germany. Indeed, during the pre-war period agreement was reached with Germany in 1908 about remilitarising the Aland Islands at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland. Nor was William II's project for a Berlin-Bagdad railway a serious cause of alarm to Russia. In 1910 the two countries signed a convention by which (in return for recognition of her zone in Persia) Russia agreed not only to drop opposition to the railway, but also to build a Persian line to link up with it.

The trouble was that William II was rather short-sighted; he failed to agree to loans, which drove Russia to link herself more closely with France. William's hopes of playing off Britain against Russia (whilst remaining on

good terms with both) also failed. Nicholas tended to regard the Kaiser with friendliness; he met him at Bjorko in 1905 and considered an alliance, but the Russian Foreign Office favoured France, the Russian exchequer desperately needed French loans, and Foreign Minister Lamsdorff had to point out to Nicholas that he could hardly expect to be an ally of Germany and an ally of France.

2. *The Entente with Britain.*

The first Moroccan crisis and the Algeciras Conference found Britain and Russia acting together to back the French and thwart William II. The French worked hard to foster good relations between Britain and Russia and discussions were opened between Sir Arthur Nicolson, ambassador in St. Petersburg, and the new Foreign Minister Izvolski. Both countries found good reason for ceasing to clash in the Near East: Britain disliked Germany's growing influence in Turkey, Russia feared renewed German penetration of Persia, and agreement was reached in 1907. By this agreement tension was lessened in Persia (which was divided into Russian, British, and neutral zones), Afghanistan (Russia agreed it was outside her sphere of influence, Britain agreed not to stir up anti-Russian trouble there), and Tibet (Chinese sovereignty over it was recognised).

3. *Russia's increased interest in the Balkans.*

These agreements, plus the defeat at the hands of Japan, drove Russia towards the Balkans as an area for expansion; moreover this policy pleased the *Duma* members. But the situation in the Balkans was explosive as tension built up between Serbia and Austria, for Serbia resented the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovnia, and demanded compensation. A tough Austrian attitude was encouraged by the knowledge of German backing. Though Serbia failed to obtain compensation, her feelings became increasingly bitter, and since Serbia's relations with Russia were close, Russia, too, felt humiliated. The attack of the Balkan League on Turkey in 1912 made Austria fear that an over-mighty Serbia, with access to the sea, would seek to split the Austrian empire by launching a campaign to stir up the many Serbs living within the Austrian empire.

The war proved successful for the League, but Austria, backed by Germany, stepped in to deny Serbia the chief spoils—an outlet to the Adriatic.

Once again a period of tension ensued between Austria and Russia. Once again Russia backed down, and a furious Serbia demanded alternative gains. This provoked a war with Bulgaria, at whose expense Serbia sought to expand. The outbreak of war delighted Austria; but the outcome was a further gain in land for Serbia. Bulgaria became an easy prey to Austrian propaganda. The Austrians now felt that they had to take the next opportunity that arose to crush Serbia before it was too late. The murder of the Austrian Arch-Duke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo afforded just that opportunity. With German backing, an Austrian ultimatum demanding humiliating terms from Serbia was presented, and though the Serbs gave in almost completely, having reservations on only two points, the Austrians brushed aside the answer and began to mobilise their forces.

Although William II and his Chancellor now had second thoughts about sending Germany as a 'knight in shining armour' to the aid of Austria in distress, it was too late to control the military machines, and too late to master the popular fervour that they themselves had helped to stimulate. German war plans were based on the scheme of a dead general, Schlieffen, and involved an attack first on France, then on Russia, on the assumption that France could be beaten in a few weeks before the clumsy Russian military machine could begin to function. When Russia began to mobilise to go to the aid of Serbia, unwilling to suffer a third and more serious humiliation, and unwilling to see the Austrians extend their empire across the Balkans, the French alliance, and the German war plan, inevitably led to a German declaration of war in August. Perhaps if Foreign Minister Sazonov had allowed mobilisation to take place in the south only, total war might have been avoided. But it is a remote hope, in any case Sazonov accepted the views of his chief of staff, Yanushkevich, that this was technically impossible and nothing but total mobilisation would do.

B. The Events of the War

1. *The State of Russian Forces.*

Russia was plunged into a war for which she was completely unprepared, little had been done to repair the shattering damage of the war with Japan, and communications, weapons, supplies and training were all defective to a degree. Nor was the country fervently patriotic; Miliukov declared support for the government, strikes petered out, but the loyalty was temporary and superficial and the countryside was noticeably silent.

The soldiers of the army were recruited from the peasantry; though brave and stubborn they were largely ignorant of why they were fighting, their officers were frequently incompetent and their commander-in-chief, the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolayevich had only his popularity with the troops to recommend him. Arms and munitions remained desperately inadequate, especially the Russian artillery department, which was headed by an incompetent Grand Duke and administered by corrupt subordinates. In a curious way the Czar deprived himself of a valuable source of revenue to meet war needs, in a period of obsession with temperance he banned the manufacture and sale of vodka (a state monopoly had hitherto made this a moderate source of income).

2. *The Opening Offensive*

Originally the Russians had aimed to strike through Galicia to save Serbia, but the rapidity of the German advance on Paris led to a hasty offensive being mounted against East Prussia. This offensive alarmed the Germans, who had under-estimated the speed with which Russia could organise an advance; they were forced to divert part of their Western army and send it to halt the Russians. Thus the Russians contributed to the success of Joffre in stemming the German advance at the Marne.

In late August and early September, however, the poor shape of the invading Russian armies led by Rennenkamp and Samsonov, was shown up in two crushing defeats at Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes. The victorious German generals were Hindenburg and Ludendorff, and

their victory was so complete that Samsonov killed himself.

It was of small consolation that the Russian army in Galicia was triumphant, for in 1915 the Germans stiffened the Austrian forces, counter-attacked, and Mackensen took Warsaw and Vilna.

3. *The Increased confusion inside Russia.*

The shock of defeat led the *zemstvos* to form associations to aid the sick and wounded; but the Minister of the Interior hampered their activities, alarmed that they might obtain real power. The *Duma* was completely ignored, legislation was pushed through by means of Article 87.

Steadily, the Russian forces were pushed back inside their own frontier. Despite its weight the Russian steam-roller was out of date. For lack of ammunition German artillery bombardments could not be matched and infantry-men were ordered to advance weaponless to snatch up the rifles of the dead. Foreign supplies came, but communications were so bad that supplies piled up in the ports. Archangel's only outlet was a narrow gauge railway, whilst the Murmansk railway was not completed until 1917. Moreover, the rolling-stock on the railways wore out faster than it could be repaired and supplies of all sorts of industrial goods were severely reduced when the Germans occupied Poland. As the army was pushed back by the Germans, so was the zone of military control extended further inside the country, bringing consequent suffering in the form of evacuations, requisitions, and destruction in order to effect a 'scorched-earth policy'.

Discontent was inevitable. As early as December, 1914, General Yanushkevich had reported that 500 Russian prisoners, rescued by Cossacks, had roundly abused their rescuers for interfering, now despair was becoming so prevalent that the army was a most unreliable weapon to use to crush rebellions inside Russia. The Czar assumed personal command of the war, the defeats could therefore be blamed directly on him; and his wife, left in control of government, was wholly bewitched by Rasputin. The *Duma* became so critical that Nicholas let Goremykin prorogue it without fixing a date for its recall. In January,

1916, Goremykin retired. Sturmer, who took his place (and in June took over the Foreign Office too) was coarse and incompetent, the whole fabric of government cracked as ministries were filled with men approved by Rasputin.

4. *The Failure of a new Offensive.*

The war against the Austrians was going well, but the cost was great, for so many men were mobilised (on the principle that numbers would make up for deficiency in equipment) that agriculture and industry were seriously affected and areas under crops in the South East shrank, markedly because of Cossack recruiting. General Brusilov's offensive was aided by the unreliability of the Slav troops fighting for the Hapsburgs, his attack was finally halted by the Germans, but he had reduced pressure on the French and Italian fronts. But the results in Russia were to be seen not merely in industrial and agricultural production, but in discontent that showed itself by a rise in the numbers of deserters and by bitter strikes from workers made desperate by the rise in the cost of the necessities of life. The inadequate system of communications groaned uneasily under the heavy burdens of wartime, but the political consequences of the economic situation seem not to have been fully grasped by the government.

5. *The Death of Rasputin*, 1916.

In November Nicholas replaced Sturmer by A. F. Trepov, and in December the elderly Golitsyn took Trepov's place. In December, too, Rasputin was murdered by Prince Yusupov and other right wingers who hoped to free the Czar from the *staret*'s influence. None of these measures made any real difference. Rasputin's death befitted a man whose life had been so extraordinary. The cakes and wine (poisoned with cyanide) that he consumed, seemed to have no effect on him; one revolver shot failed to despatch him and he was finally shot, beaten, and hurled into the River Neva. Stories persisted that the state of his body showed that he had not even been dead when the plotters threw him into the icy waters.

6. *Conclusion.*

The events of the war, then, pushed Russia backwards. Defeat, despair, hunger, loss of industries, disruption of those remaining, the obvious incompetence of those wielding final power led to a situation in which a spontaneous outbreak of revolt was almost inevitable. Indeed it is amazing that it did not occur sooner.

BOOKS

Seton-Watson: *The Decline of Imperial Russia*, ch. 9.
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Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ch. 8.
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Charques: *The Twilight of Imperial Russia*, ch. 11.
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Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed*, ch. 8.
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QUESTIONS

1. Why was Russia involved in the First World War?
2. "The Russian Steamroller." How fair a description was this of the Russian forces in the First World War?

11. THE FEBRUARY REVOLUTION, 1917

A. General Introduction

1917 brought two totally different revolutions. The first, lacking coherent organisation, or real positive purpose other than the removal from power of the Czar, was itself overthrown by a second revolution. This second revolution sprang from the ambitions of a small group of determined men and from the failure of the government established by the first revolution to obtain the kind of results that most Russians sought. Both were basically urban revolutions. Though the revolutionaries sought to appeal to the peasantry, they did not really control them.

B. The Rising in Petrograd

1. *The Outbreak of Revolt.*

Petrograd, the capital of the Russian Empire, was the scene of frequent disorders connected with food distribu-

tion. It was from one such disturbance that revolution developed. A queue of workers, angry at being informed that there was no bread available for them, attacked the houses of people suspected of hoarding food and were rapidly joined by sympathisers. The garrison, made up of 200,000 recent peasant levies, was too untrustworthy to be sent into action. Indeed on the 27th February (by the old-style calendar) the soldiers joined the rioters and killed several of their officers and some members of the hated police. Thus the rioters gained weapons and became the virtual masters of the capital.

News of an imperial edict proroguing the *Duma* caused the rioters to swarm into the Tauride Palace to cheer the delegates and to demand bread, peace, and freedom. Not all the *Duma* members cared for this turn of events. In particular, Miliukov's Progressive Block had little desire to see a Republic established and had been planning to save the Czar by inducing him to take the *Duma* into a real partnership of government. This hope was now in vain, a popular intolerance of further misrule had ended the Czar's reign.

2. *The Petrograd Soviet re-emerges.*

So far the revolution had been spontaneous, and in much the same way factory workers, remembering 1905, set up a Soviet. The deputies, elected by acclamation, tended to be men known locally, mostly Menshevik or Trudovik in allegiance. Chkheidze was elected as president, and, as vice-president, the workers chose Kerensky, a bustling leader whose fierce oratory and ceaseless activity made him the man of the moment.

The Petrograd Soviet was copied by Moscow, and other cities followed suit, but it was the Soviet in the capital that attracted the attention. Its 'Order Number One' called on troops to form committees and refuse to obey orders that were not consistent with the orders of the Soviet. This impressive proclamation, in fact, made little difference to the morale of the army which was already nearing breaking-point.

3. *The Establishment of the Provisional Government.*

Nicholas II proved powerless to control the growing

revolution. He attempted to form a government around Rodzianko, but the latter refused to co-operate. He set off for the capital but was diverted to Pskov, headquarters of the Northern Army and there he abdicated. At first he appointed his son to succeed him, but even Nicholas realised that a sickly boy was hardly likely to be capable of managing the crisis. Instead, he offered the succession to his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. But Michael felt far too insecure, he refused to accept unless he was offered the crown by a Constituent Assembly. Thus power slipped to a Provisional Government, led by Prince Lvov, which sprang from the *Duma* and feared that unless it asserted its authority the Soviet would seize power. In fact, these fears of the Soviet were groundless, it was dominated by Mensheviks who still clung to their strict Marxist view that the bourgeois revolution must be previous to (and distinct from) the proletarian revolution. In any case, differences about war policy were helping to paralyse both sections of the Social Democrat Party. The Mensheviks found themselves in rather a hopeless compromise, they pressed the government to end the war on a democratic programme; but the Bolsheviks appeared totally split. This split was demonstrated by the policy of the party paper *Pravda*. Molotov, Kalinin, and Ereemev (in the absence of more eminent leaders) had been following Lenin's line and denouncing the war as bourgeois and imperialistic, but Kamenev returned to Russia and altered this policy.

C. Dual Rule: Provisional Government and Soviet

1. *Introduction.*

Difficulties beset the Provisional Government. It never really exerted effective control over the country, it was an uneasy compromise between differing elements, and its popularity was small. Prince Lvov, though well meaning, was unrealistic, and Miliukov (in charge of foreign policy) was soon giving offence by his aggressive policies. Kerensky, who had been made Minister of Justice, was regarded by the Liberals with grave suspicion.

For the moment the Liberals were the dominant group,

but their concern for the correct constitutional procedure was ill-suited to the military and internal crisis. In particular the peasantry were being driven by the extremity of their condition to take over landlords' estates, and since most soldiers were recruited from the peasantry, they could hardly be used to put a stop to this. Indeed, many soldiers were deserting in order to join their families in this land grabbing, 'voting for peace with their legs', as Lenin put it.

2. *The Power of the Soviet.*

Although the Petrograd Soviet was not plotting active rebellion, it did little to assist the Provisional Government. Its power and prestige were considerable, the Minister of War, Guchkov, resigned in disgust that he had so little effective authority and the Soviet had so much. Workers and soldiers checked with the Soviet before obeying the Government's orders; a Soviet official helped to guard the ex-Czar; banks applied to the Soviet for permission to open; Soviet pressure induced the dismissal of the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaevich from his post as Commander in Chief.

3. *Failure of the Provisional Government to carry out Reforms.*

Lvov's administration failed to tackle many critical problems, yet these problems were too urgent to be set aside until the long awaited Constituent Assembly met. By its reluctance to act the Government lost prestige and encouraged others to seize the initiative. Nothing was done about the chaotic state of local government. The subject nationalities' plea for greater freedom was ignored (except in Finland where a constitution was permitted). This led to the emergence in the Ukraine of Rada, a group that sought to negotiate a settlement with the Germans. An amnesty was issued to political prisoners, but this simply had the effect of releasing scores of revolutionaries whose behaviour showed little sense of gratitude to the Liberals. Attempts to solve the land problem consisted, chiefly, of the inquiries of a Main Land Committee. In addition, the economy suffered from a dispute between

workers made angry by inflation, and employers who closed down rather than give way to demands.

4. *Foreign Policy.*

The Provisional Government committed itself to a continuation of the war. In the name of democracy the Western Powers welcomed the new régime, some western politicians had held the view that German influence in Czarist Russia had impeded Russian war effort. The French ambassador in Russia, Paléologue, was particularly forward in supporting Miliukov who was becoming so forceful in his pronouncements that Lvov felt obliged to assure Russia's allies that Russia was not seeking to extend her empire. Miliukov's note, asserting that Russia would fulfil her obligations to the full, provoked a hostile demonstration by the Petrograd workers that might have had serious consequences if the Soviet had not checked it in the knowledge that General Kornilov was ready to use artillery on the demonstrators. The British ambassador, Buchanan, felt that a better Russian war effort would be obtained if the Provisional Government secured wider backing by making an effort to win over moderate Socialists.

5. *The Reorganisation of the Provisional Government.*

Buchanan was, then, quite pleased to hear of the resignation of Miliukov, who was angry with Lvov for appealing to the Soviet to share the responsibility of government. In the reorganisation Kerensky was promoted to the post of Minister of War, the S.R. Chernov became Minister of Agriculture, and two Mensheviks, Skobalev and Tsereteli, occupied the Ministries of Labour and Posts and Telegraphs respectively.

In fact, this reorganised ministry, far from integrating the two chief centres of power, emphasised the duality of government. The socialists, though owing their posts to the *Duma*'s Provisional Committee, regarded themselves as responsible to the Soviet.

With Lvov still at its head, the new government proclaimed as its aims a peace without annexations and a reorganisation of the land in the interests of the people. In July, 1917, Kerensky launched Brusilov's army in a

new offensive that met initial success against the Austrians in Galicia, and pleased the American agent, Elihu Root who had asserted that American loans depended on a vigorous Russian war effort. But, once more, the Russians were halted by the Germans. Once more they retreated, suffering heavily, and losing control of Poland whose valuable industrial resources fell to the enemy.

6. *Kerensky's Rise to become Prime Minister.*

Despite its reorganisation to include moderate Socialists, the government failed to win the allegiance of workers. Its promises of social reform meant little, its labour exchanges and schemes of social insurance were not a great success, indeed, an All-Russian Conference of Factory Committees had demanded that they should control production. Despairing of success, and resenting his colleague's plans to deal with the agricultural problem before a Constituent Assembly met, Lvov resigned. With him went the rest of the Liberals, alarmed at the leftward trend of government, and Kerensky took over the leadership. Though he meant well and firmly believed in democracy and socialism, Kerensky was not even fully master of his own capital.

Books

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Deutscher: *Stalin*, ch. 5.
Kochan: *The Making of Modern Russia*, ch. 15.

Questions

1. Why did the overthrow of Nicholas II prove so easy?
2. Account for the inability of the Provisional Government to rule effectively.
3. A contemporary observer described Kerensky as being able to run and jump on the mud of revolution when

others were struggling to find their feet; why was he so successful at first, and so unsuccessful later?

12. THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION

A. Bolshevik Fortunes, February to August, 1917

1. *Their part in the February Revolution.*

In the first revolution, the Bolsheviks had been caught, unprepared, their leaders in exile. Thus the Provisional Government and the Petrograd Soviet were both free of Bolshevik influence, and Bolsheviks in Russia tended to act as individuals, not as units of a monolithic party. That party policy was, in any case, far from clear can be seen in the way *Pravda*'s attitude to the war veered from total hostility to qualified approval. Molotov headed those in Russia who favoured a 'hard' hostile policy to the Provisional Government, but Kamenev considered that a more amiable policy would be more appropriate.

2. *Lenin's return to Russia.*

In April the Germans allowed Lenin and his colleagues to return to Russia in a sealed train, they regarded him not so much as an ally than as a man likely to disrupt the Russian war effort. Lenin was sometimes attacked for being a German agent, but he himself saw it quite differently and considered that he was using the Germans. Lenin was welcomed at the Finland station by a crowd headed by Chkheidze, the Menshevik President of the Soviet, but this Social Democrat unity was very brief. In a speech to a large gathering of socialists in the Tauride Palace, Lenin denounced the Provisional Government and the war, and asserted that the only possible form of revolutionary government would be a Soviet of Workers' Deputies. These assertions, the 'April Theses', also included demands for the nationalisation of land and banks, the transfer of all large estates to Soviet-controlled farms, the creation of a Revolutionary International, and fraternisation with the enemy in the trenches. When Plekhanov heard the April Theses he declared that Lenin must be mad, but uncomprising Bolsheviks like Stalin found this vigorous policy welcome. Lenin had to fight hard through speeches and newspaper articles to convince the Party

of the wisdom of his policy, but he eventually succeeded and the party adopted "all power to the Soviets" as its slogan.

3. *The Return of Trotsky.*

Trotsky returned to Russia from exile, eager for action. His policy of socialist reconciliation, and pride on both sides, kept him, still, apart from Lenin although Trotsky increasingly came to see that in Lenin lay the only hope of decisive and dramatic action. A small group of able men, among them Lunacharsky, followed Trotsky, who was also very popular in Kronstadt where he defended the sailors' resistance to the imposition of government discipline.

4. *Growth of Bolshevik importance.*

Though they were only a small minority party, events seemed, for the moment, to favour the Bolsheviks. They were not compromised by participation in the feeble Liberal-Socialist coalition formed after Miliukov's resignation, and many Bolsheviks held key posts as shop stewards or factory or regiment delegates. The task of co-ordinating such men and ensuring that they knew the policy of the party's Central Committee was carried out efficiently by Sverdlov and Stalin.

To other socialists, Bolshevik confidence seemed amusing or irritating. A conference of Soviets laughed when Lenin declared that Tsereteli was wrong in asserting that no political party was ready for full power, and Kerensky, reprimanding Lenin for his attitude, compared his party to the Czarist police. But, although they far outnumbered the Bolsheviks, the other socialist groups were unwise to ridicule the Bolsheviks for they themselves were riddled with divisions. The Social Revolutionary Party contained a steadily widening gulf between the left S.R.s who wanted land to be transferred to the peasants before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, and the Right S.R.s who tended to follow Kerensky. The leading non-Bolshevik socialists, Chernov and Martov, were not men of action, whereas both Lenin and Trotsky (who joined the Bolsheviks in August) brilliantly combined fervent oratory with finesse in planning action.

5. The July Rising.

Bolshevik hopes appeared to be ruined by an unsuccessful revolt in July, 1917. This rising sprang from the dwindling patience of workers in Petrograd with the miseries of their existence and the costly war offensive, to them the February Revolution was discredited. To the cry of "all power to the Soviets" a regiment of machine gunners and the Kronstadt sailors broke into open revolt and the Bolshevik leaders were dragged in by their desire to control an outbreak that they deplored as premature. The rising was badly planned and received no support from the Petrograd garrison, Kerensky was able to brand the rebels as German agents and it was crushed by troops. The Bolshevik Party appeared to be broken by this setback. *Pravda* was closed down, Kamenev was arrested, and Lenin and Zinoviev fled to Finland. Only Stalin remained at large as an active leader, for his role had been sufficiently anonymous to make punishment seem unnecessary.

B. The Kornilov 'Coup'

1. *Introduction.*

Good fortune rescued the Bolsheviks from the disarray into which the July Days had put them. Kerensky was not sufficiently powerful to stamp out Bolshevism and in any case he, like many other socialists, lacked the ruthlessness that was later to be such a feature of Bolshevik rule. A serious threat to his position was enough to cause Kerensky to enlist his recent Bolshevik enemies as allies. Thus their fortunes revived and they were able to themselves displace Kerensky whom they had just helped to rescue.

2. *Kerensky's Difficulties.*

The setbacks suffered by Brusilov's army had weakened Kerensky's position. He lost more popularity by deferring the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. To try and rally support around his government he summoned a conference of delegates from all the important sections of society. The conference met in the Bolshoi theatre and, as an instrument of unity, was an utter failure for while

the workers cheered Kerensky, the wealthier classes hailed General Kornilov, the new Commander-in-Chief, as their hero.

3. *General Kornilov.*

The new commander was 47, the son of a Siberian peasant, tough and brave and an impressive sight with his bodyguards clad in their long red Asian cloaks. Kornilov had plans for stern measures to put the country on its feet, including the militarisation of the railways, and the application of military methods to troublesome factories. He had already stationed General Krymov near Petrograd with orders to act if the Bolsheviks caused further trouble.

4. *The Quarrel between Kornilov and Kerensky.*

An open clash between the two men was precipitated by the activities of V.N. Lvov, a minor government official who visited Kornilov as a kind of self-appointed government emissary. Lvov suggested to Kornilov that the choice lay between serving in a dictatorship headed by Kerensky, or heading a dictatorship himself. Naturally the General declared that he would prefer to head his own dictatorship, and he confirmed this by telephone to Kerensky after Lvov had informed the Prime Minister of his conversation with Kornilov. Kerensky ordered the arrest of Kornilov. Kornilov ordered General Krymov to march on the capital. It was in this crisis that Kerensky appealed for Bolshevik aid. The Kronstadt sailors proved an invaluable support for the régime, and the Bolsheviks emerged as the most determined defenders of the revolution. Krymov's troops proved unreliable, prompt sabotage by railway and telegraph workers hampered his advance and the attempted coup collapsed when Krymov shot himself. Kornilov submitted to arrest, and Kerensky made himself commander in chief.

This episode enabled the Bolsheviks to organise their Red Guard, to be used in the defence of Kerensky (and shortly afterwards to overturn him!). It also facilitated the establishment in the Petrograd Soviet of the Military Revolutionary Committee to organise the city's defences. This body, led by Trotsky, was to be the chief instrument in overthrowing Kerensky.

C. The October Revolution

1. *The decision to Revolt.*

The Kornilov episode convinced Lenin that the overthrow of Kerensky was perfectly feasible and he urgently pressed his fellow Bolsheviks to effect it. On the 23rd October he emerged from hiding in order to attend a Central Committee meeting where he managed to win a majority and commit the party to immediate preparation for an armed revolution. The party was not united, however, Kamenev and Zinoviev led the opposition, Kamenev even resigned from the Central Committee and published a letter denouncing the party's decision to revolt. This publicity brought temporary disgrace for Kamemev and an awkward situation for the party whose plans were thus exposed. Hasty disavowals were published, but in any case Kerensky seemed unable to do much about it. Not only were reliable troops hard to come by, Kerensky's temperament inclined him to oratory rather than to prompt, ruthless action.

2. *The Organisation of the Revolution.*

Lenin returned to his hiding place leaving Trotsky, helped by Lunacharsky, Kollontai and Voloslarsky to organise the details of the insurrection. The members of the Military Revolutionary Committee were each responsible for a different sector of the city, their agents worked on factory employees and army units. The 20,000 Red Guards, now armed, were the key to success: the chief danger came from the garrison of the Peter and Paul fortress. Trotsky took the risk of visiting these soldiers and emerged, triumphant, with an oath of loyalty from them to the Petrograd Soviet. The preparation and weapons cost money and Lenin's enemies later alleged that this money had come from the Germans by way of Parvus, an ex-S.D., now in Stockholm. Certainly some money did reach Lenin from Germany as part of the policy of assisting anyone who would be likely to disrupt the Russian war effort

3. *The Revolution.*

On the 7th November (25th October by the old calendar) the Bolsheviks seized key points in the capital with smooth

efficiency. Kerensky escaped, but his government seat, the Winter Palace, was menaced by the Bolshevik cruiser *Aurora* (firing blanks). Shortly afterwards, to the accompaniment of brief fighting, Moscow, too, fell to the Bolsheviks. A wave of drunkenness followed as the long suppressed under-dog celebrated his triumph.

The apathy or disunity of the Bolsheviks' enemies, the appeal of Lenin's slogan of 'bread, peace and land', the skill of the Bolshevik leadership, all contributed to success. It was not so much that most Russians positively favoured the Bolsheviks—they controlled only a small area of the country—it was rather that by late 1917 no reliable force could be found to deal with this small minority of dedicated men who acted from ideological beliefs as well as from a desire for power. Thus a Marxist party had achieved power. But it was not in one of the more industrially advanced nations that it had triumphed, and this was to present a persistent problem, for the party represented such a small sector of society and considerable force was necessary to hold on to power. The more numerous Mensheviks had good reason to argue that it was they (with their policy of waiting for the growth of the proletariat) who were the true Marxists, and that Leninism was a heresy. Lenin, however, never found that pure theory was an obstacle, he and his colleagues now busied themselves with securing their position.

Books

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Deutscher: *Stalin*, ch. 5.
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Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ch. 9.
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, ch. 3.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, chs. 11 to 14.
Reed: 10 *Days that shook the World.*
Carr: *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 1, ch. 4.
Kochan: *The Making of Modern Russia*, ch. 15.

Questions

1. Account for the fact that there were two revolutions in Russia in 1917.

2. Why was so tiny a group able to seize hold of the government of so huge a country?

3. Compare the roles of Lenin, Trotsky and Stalin in the October Revolution.

TERRITORIES LOST BY RUSSIA IN THE TREATY OF BREST-LITOVSK, 1918.

13. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS OF POWER

A. Introduction

Numerous difficulties demanded urgent attention, though most Bolsheviks believed that a world (or at least West European) revolution was imminent and would transform the situation. These difficulties included:

(i) that of Kerensky, who was trying to gather together an army,
(ii) the question of the Constituent Assembly, due to meet soon,
(iii) the problem of whether power should be shared with other left-wing groups,
(iv) the question of how far the Bolsheviks should go in attempting to create a Communist state.

B. Internal Reorganisation

1. *The Defeat of Kerensky.*

The very shaky position of the Bolsheviks led them to form an alliance with the Left S.R., and some Mensheviks. To Lenin and Trotsky this was merely a temporary expedient, but Kamenev, Zinoviev and Rykov regarded it as correct policy; thus it provided yet another example of the absence of monolithic unity in the party. The Bolsheviks proclaimed Russia to be a Republic of Soviets, and a few Left S.R.s were allowed into the Council of Commissars (Sovnarkom) which, for the moment, wielded power over the very limited areas that the Bolsheviks controlled.

Kerensky proved surprisingly easy to defeat. He had found it very difficult to obtain help, for many commanders regarded him as just one more member of the Left wing, the whole of which they considered loathsome. Eventually General Krasnov agreed to march his 480 Cossacks to Petrograd whilst military cadets staged an uprising. The Bolsheviks obtained the aid of a number of army officers, notably Colonels Valden and Muraviev. Some officers helped them because they hated Kerensky, some because they were careerists or desperados. With such leadership the Red Guards halted the Cossacks at Gatchina and

forced their surrender at Pulkovo. The cadets' rising was crushed, and Kerensky fled.

2. *The Constituent Assembly.*

This long awaited assembly was allowed to meet in January, 1918. However, Lenin had already made it clear in his 'Thesis on the Constituent Assembly' that the Assembly was now irrelevant, being a form of bourgeois democracy that was inferior to the proletarian democracy of the Soviets.

A majority of the delegates were hostile to the Bolsheviks who had 175 delegates as against the 410 S.R.s (who were mainly Right S.R.s) the 16 Mensheviks and the 17 cadets. The Cadets were outlawed, the Right S.R. leader Auxentiev, was arrested, and the Bolsheviks and their Left S.R. allies left the Assembly when Chernov was elected as chairman. The remaining delegates delivered speeches attacking the Bolsheviks until the guards, claiming to be tired, dispersed them and fired on a crowd that demonstrated in favour of the Assembly. Thus the body from which so much had, for months, been anticipated, in fact achieved nothing.

3. *The Land Problem.*

A series of decrees, largely Left S.R. in tone, abolished the landlords' rights without compensation, organised a few special properties to be administered as communes by the state, and left the bulk of the land to go to the peasants. In fact these laws simply recognised what had been happening in the countryside; for the moment, as Lenin realised, it was not expedient to intervene.

4. *The Increase in Party Control.*

The Bolsheviks' policies were subjected to a succession of Soviet Congresses, but the party managed to do much to control, in advance, the composition of these Congresses. Thus Lenin began to put into operation his beliefs about the dictatorship of an élite, beliefs which many other socialists loathed. Through Sovnarkom decrees, the Bolsheviks shut down hostile newspapers, and replaced the judicial system with a series of peoples' courts. The Czarist political police, the *Okhrana*, was

abolished, only to be replaced by a new body, the Cheka (the All Russian Extraordinary Commission to fight Counter Revolution and Sabotage) which was run by a Pole, Dzerzhinski.

The Bolsheviks felt true Marxist scorn for the bourgeois superstitions of Christianity, foisted on the people as an 'opium' to keep them tolerant of present misery by making them promises of future glory. Civil marriage and divorce were instituted, and when Patriarch Tikhon denounced Bolshevism, the Church's schools were closed down and most of its property was seized.

5. *The Economy.*

This presented particularly acute difficulties, for the war had seriously disrupted the economy and the October Revolution had been a signal for many workers to seize control of the factories. But an immediate transition to a socialistic economy was not on the party's agenda. Key economic positions like the banks, the Putilov Arms Works and the Moscow Electricity Works were seized, but other firms were simply directed by the state through its supreme economic council, *Vesenkha*, and its sub-departments, *Glavki.* Not till March, 1918, was a whole industry nationalised, and then the sugar industry was taken over. In June the vital oil industry was nationalised, and a number of individual firms were also seized on the government's contention that the employers were seeking to carry out sabotage. In fact it proved very difficult to enforce this policy of controlled capitalism, workers had to be forbidden from taking over management, and were restricted to having committees to supervise production, fix minimum output, and help stabilise the costs of production.

6. *The Trade Unions.*

The October Revolution created a particularly odd situation in the trade unions. The Bolshevik leaders tended to argue that now that a party dedicated to the proletariat had achieved power, the unions' old functions were no longer necessary. Lozovsky, secretary of the All Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, was expelled from the

party for his continued adherence to the normal practices of trade union pressure and bargaining for better conditions. This harsh policy led Maxim Gorky to protest to Lenin, and it is hard to know how far the policy was an attempt to obtain greater power, and how far it was a sincere expression of socialist faith. The railway union continued to behave so independently that the government, having tried in vain to channel off the railwaymen into a rival puppet union, was forced to take dictatorial powers over rail transport.

7. *The New Constitution.*

In March, 1918, the Bolsheviks adopted the title of Russian Communist Party; in July they proclaimed a new constitution for the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic. Supreme power was declared to be in the hands of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets meeting twice a year. Since the delegates totalled over 1,000 the Congress delegated its functions to a Central Executive Council (Tsik). This body contained 200 members so it, too, delegated its authority. Power, therefore, was wielded by Sovnarkom (The Council of Peoples' Commissars) which could legislate by decree as well as exercise executive functions.

Local government consisted of a pyramid of Soviets rising from the city and village Soviets. The elections for these were by no means free and open; ecclesiastics, ex-police, and private business men, were among the non-enfranchised groups, voting was open, and other parties were outlawed. Though the local soviets contained men not committed to any party, the pyramid system produced a monopoly of power for the communists in the upper reaches of authority. Most of the rulers thrown up by this, supposedly, proletariat revolution, were not themselves members of the proletariat, in fact Lenin's distrust of workers in key posts led to a dispute with Left Communists (a curious term!) who published their attacks on Lenin's "state capitalism" in a magazine.

8. *The Persistent Problems of Power.*

The October Revolution had given the Bolsheviks an ascendancy which most Russians felt would be brief, over

a region that was limited by German occupation, by hostile movements growing up in fringe areas, and by the peasantry who cared little for Marxist theorising. They were faced with the problems of asserting their authority over the country, of making the peace with the Germans and of attempting to reorganise the economy. Nor was the party united in close unity behind Lenin. Kamenev and Zinoviev had returned to favour, but they, like Rykov, had clashed with Lenin over policy on several occasions and, at the other extreme, men like Bukharin felt that Lenin was too moderate. The clash between what dedicated Marxists felt they ought to do, and the urgent necessity of ruling led to continual, furious debates. Lenin's qualities as a leader are shown by his skill in holding together the various Bolshevik groups and in overcoming some, at least, of the difficulties. Moreover debate did take place, and the defeated were not cruelly persecuted; under Stalin such open discussion was to fade away into stifled silence.

C. The Treaty of Brest Litovsk

1. *Trotsky's Policy.*

As Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Trotsky was responsible for inviting all the belligerents to agree to a general armistice. Not surprisingly, only the Germans agreed, and during December an armistice took effect on the Eastern Front and a conference met to consider a peace treaty. Trotsky seems to have believed, still, in the stalemate of trench warfare, and though tanks and the entry of the U.S.A. had altered the situation, he feared the capitalist belligerents might make peace in order to attack Russia. The allies made an attempt to secure a Bolshevik return to the fray by trying to define their war aims to make them more agreeable to the Soviet Government. Yet both Lloyd George and Wilson felt it was probably hopeless, they suspected the Bolsheviks were German agents and the Bolshevik repudiation of foreign debts widened the gulf.

The terms demanded by the Germans were harsh, and included the loss of Poland and the Baltic States which were to become free. The party was fiercely divided when it considered these terms. Trotsky hoped the world revolu-

tion would make acceptance unnecessary, and tried to spin out negotiations, but Bukharin favoured revolutionary war. Lenin felt that peace, however humiliating the terms, was an urgent necessity. His agreement (in private) with Trotsky that if the Germans would not co-operate, then the treaty should be signed did not solve the question, for the agreement was ambiguous, and whereas Trotsky thought signing necessary only if the Germans actually attacked, Lenin understood that Trotsky would sign if faced with an ultimatum.

2. *The German Advance.*

Trotsky's attempts to delay negotiations and distribute propaganda to German troops were cut brutally short by the Germans who needed the matter settled so that they could shift forces to the West before U.S. troops arrived in massive force. His final device was to declare that the war was over, and the Russian army demolished, in the hope that if the Germans attempted to advance their soldiers would revolt and precipitate the longed-for revolution. This failed utterly, the Germans signed a separate peace with Rada in the Ukraine and advanced rapidly on Petrograd. In panic the Russians sued for peace and waited four unhappy days before receiving the stiff German terms.

3. *The Acceptance of the Treaty.*

Once again argument raged in the Bolshevik camp. Lenin, referring frequently to the Treaty of Tilsit imposed by Napoleon, and the Prussian recovery which followed, argued for peace on any terms since a respite was essential for Russia. Lenin's opponents contended that a respite would be useless, for Germany would control most of the valuable areas and would cut off supplies of grain, oil and coal. Eventually, by 7 votes to 4, the Central Committee of the Party decided to accept the terms. Trotsky did not vote, and handed over control of foreign affairs to Chicherin. The Left S.R.s were violently opposed to the peace. They broke off their alliance with the Bolsheviks and, soon afterwards, staged a brave but badly organised rising in Moscow which achieved little but the assassination of Mirbach, the German Ambassador.

The peace, signed on the 3rd March, 1918, deprived Russia of Poland, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, part of White Russia, the Ukraine, Bessarabia and part of Transcaucasia. These losses added up to one-quarter of Russian territory, a third of her population, and included many valuable heavy industries.

Books

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Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ch. 11.
Moorehead: *The Russian Revolution*, chs. 15 and 16.
Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, chs. 26 and 27.
Wheeler Bennett: *Brest-Litovsk, the forgotten peace*.

Questions

1. Describe the differences among the Bolsheviks about signing a peace treaty with Germany.
2. Why was the Constituent Assembly such a fiasco?
3. What were the immediate effects on the Russian economy of the Bolshevik seizure of power?

THE CIVIL WAR

Territories held at various times by Anti-Bolsheviks



14. THE CIVIL WAR

A. Introduction

The Bolsheviks were menaced by enemies who ranged from Social Revolutionaries to supporters of a military dictatorship. These enemies were supported by Czechs, Japanese, British, French, Americans and Poles and they were entrenched in Siberia and in the South of Russia. The obvious dangers necessitated a drastic strengthening of the Red Army and an increase in its efficiency. The bulk of this work fell on the War Commissar, Trotsky, who displayed great energy in building up the army and in directing its activities from an armoured train.

B. The Two Sides

1. *The Red Army.*

The reorganisation of the army was a difficult problem; the Bolsheviks had no desire to create a force that might turn on its masters, yet they needed officers, and many offcers were not Communists and were reluctant to serve. One exception to this was General Bonch Bruevich whom Trotsky ordered to organise a General Staff. Formal discipline returned to the army (Trotsky argued that a soldiers' committee was hardly the fit means to lead troops into battle) but though officers recovered authority, they themselves were carefully watched. In 1918 over three-quarters of the commanding and administrative staffs were old régime officers and Trotsky made a great show of using the death penalty to punish treacherous officers. A register of officers' families was kept, and commissars were attached to the army at every level with the right to countersign every order.

At first Trotsky hoped that revolutionary fervour would be sufficient to drive back the foe, but this proved inadequate (indeed some Red Guards objected to serving under ex-Czarist officers) and on the 29th May, 1918, conscription was introduced, vigorously enforced by the Cheka.

2. *The Whites.*

That Communism survived the perils that faced it was due as much to the disunity of its enemies as to the skill of Communistic leadership. The 'Whites', as they came

to be called, occupied fringe positions that made co-ordination difficult, whilst the Red Army held the advantage of interior lines. The Whites were united only by hostility to the Communists, they had no concerted common policy that was positive, for S.R.s, Right Wingers and Liberals differed violently with each other. The foreign aid that they received was hesitant; President Wilson was never keen on it. Socialists in Britain and France disliked it, and the Japanese and Poles were simply interested in private land grabbing. Allied intervention had, at first, the excuse of the desire to obtain a Russian government that would re-open the Eastern Front against Germany. But this reason evaporated when the armistice was signed with Germany in 1918, and one by one the rather embarrassed allies withdrew their forces.

C. The Events of the War

1. *The Revolt of the Czech Legion.*

The Civil War began in earnest with the revolt of the Czech Legion. Many Czechs, resentful of fighting for the Hapsburg cause had deserted to the Russians and about 45,000 of them were armed and organised by the Provisional Government. The Bolsheviks attempted to get rid of this sizable and possibly hostile force, but, suspicious of alterations to their travel arrangements, the Czechs seized part of the Trans-Siberian Railway and established themselves on the middle Volga, forming a shield behind which anti-Bolsheviks could group. At Samara a body called the *Komuch* (a committee of members of the Constituent Assembly) emerged and began to build up an army. One of the first victims of the civil war was Nicholas, the former Czar, who, together with his family, was murdered at Ekaterinburg by order of the local commissar who feared that the advancing Czechs would rescue Nicholas.

Until the Czechs took the field, an Eastern Front against the Communists had been a very doubtful proposition; British and French leaders persuaded President Wilson that the Czechs should be helped or the Trans-Siberian Railway would be seized by Austrian and German

prisoners of war. 7,000 Americans were sent, only to spend most of their time guarding sections of the railway.

2. *Kolchak.*

Trotsky dashed hastily to the front and helped to stem the Whites' advance, but dangers in the North and South were now also appearing. The Whites in Siberia were divided between the supporters of the former Black Sea Fleet Commander, Admiral Kolchak, who, despite his inexperience of land warfare and of politics, was emerging as the leading Right Wing figure, and the S.R.s whom the Czechs favoured. This split led to violence in November, 1918. Kolchak suppressed the S.R.s and the Czechs lost interest in the war and ceased to be a serious factor, though their captain, Gajda, remained for some time to aid Kolchak. The Siberian peasantry tended, also, to be S.R. in sympathy. Kolchak had to resort to cruel methods in order to find soldiers and this helped to create a partisan movement which the Bolsheviks managed to penetrate.

Kolchak, at first did quite well, but was then brought to a halt by the Red Army under Frunze. When Frunze was transferred to the more urgent Southern front, Trotsky supported the new commander, Vatzetis, in following a very cautious policy of pursuit for fear of a trap. The Bolshevik leadership opposed Trotsky in this, he had to let Kamenev take over command for a more vigorous pursuit. The Siberian peasantry, S.R. in sympathy, but with sufficient land to not see their own interests seriously involved, gave little aid to either side. Kolchak's leadership simply proved inept, and his forces inadequate. He was finally handed over to a Bolshevik committee in Irkutsk by discontented Czechs on 15th January, 1920, and was shot.

3. *The War in North Russia.*

Anti-Communism in North Russia centred around Murmansk and Archangel. The Communists angered the British by seizing war stores in Archangel, moreover these ports were reasonably near to Britain, thus making interference attractive. Murmansk, a new port near the Norwegian and Finnish borders was ice-free because of the

Gulf Stream, and the Soviet there, under Yurov, disliked the new masters of Russia and collaborated with the British. Archangel was then seized without difficulty, but a respected non-Communist authority was lacking there, and though former Constituent Assembly members gathered, it proved far harder to hold than it had been to capture. Peace with Germany, the growing strength of the Red Army and the hostility of the Labour Party to Churchill's interventionism made the continued presence of British troops in North Russia an embarassment; they were withdrawn in Autumn 1919, taking some Russians with them, but leaving many anti-Bolsheviks in Murmansk to the mercy of the Red Army.

4. *Yudenich.*

The second danger from the North came in October, 1919, when Yudenich with 20,000 men made a desperate attempt to rush from Estonia and seize Petrograd. He was within 30 miles of the city when his attack broke down. If his offensive had been co-ordinated with Denikin's advance from the South, perhaps something might have come of it; as it was the episode served chiefly to enhance the reputation of Stalin who took a leading part in organising the defence of Petrograd.

5. *Denikin.*

In the South of Russia, White forces were powerful, and received allied assistance. The French established themselves in Odessa, the British occupied the valuable oil regions around Batum (where, indeed, they hung on until July, 1920). White forces in the South were originally organised by Alexeyev, command then changed hands rapidly going first to Kornilov, then to Kaledin, a man of the Don Cossacks. Kaledin's nerve cracked when faced by a Red Army advance; he resigned and killed himself. His place was taken by Denikin, a moderate republican of questionable military skill, suspected by left and right alike. It was as Kolchak was retreating that Denikin, having seized Tsaritsyn, the Donetz coal basin and Kharkov began a thrust on Moscow with 100,000 men, a thrust that took him to within 200 miles of the city. However Denikin differed with Cossacks, Ukranians and

Caucasians because of his Russian nationalism, his cabinet was split into three factions, and his section of troops under MaiMaevsky was particularly undisciplined. The other wing of Denikin's army was commanded by Wrangel, an outstanding cavalry general who had been urging Denikin to link up with Kolchak. The Red Army drove back the Whites, pursuing them into the part of Novorossiisk; with British aid the force was evacuated to the Crimea where command was shifted to Wrangel.

6. *Wrangel.*

Wrangel obtained a greater degree of discipline from his army. Though more conservative than Denikin, he was also more capable, and he was aided by Struve and Krivoshein. Denikin had never got beyond promises of reforms, Wrangel actually applied a land reform programme in the regions he controlled. But his forces were too small to withstand an attack from Frunze once the Red Army had freed itself from war with the Poles, and Wrangel was forced, in November, 1920, to evacuate the Crimea and go to Constantinople.

7. *The Polish War.*

The Polish threat to the Communists differed from the other three dangers in that it united non-Communists with Communists against a foreign foe. Trotsky was rather embarrassed by the fervour with which the ex-Czarist general, Brusilov, offered his services to the Red Army. With the collapse of Germany, a power vacuum lay to the West of the areas controlled by the Communists. Trotsky was eager for the Red Army to fill this vacuum; Pilsudski, the Polish leader, had similar hopes for the Polish army. The chief area of the dispute was the Ukraine where the pro-German Skoropadski régime collapsed with the defeat of its protector. The Communists under Piatov and Rakovsky made a bid for power there which was not a success, they were too scornful of Ukranian nationalism and their collectivisation policy caused chaos.

The Polish offensive into the Ukraine was halted and with Pilsidski in retreat, pursued by the brilliant 26-year old General Tukhachevsky, and by Yegorov and Budienny, an argument began as to how far the pursuit should be

carried. Lenin rejected a British offer of mediation, and, against Trotsky's wishes, advocated the continuation of pursuit over the Curzon Line which the British had suggested as a Russo-Polish frontier. Lenin hoped that a Red Army advance to the West might provoke a revolution, and would certainly enable contact to be made with Germany. But the argument became pointless when Pilsudski counter-attacked, striking at the dangerously large gap which had opened up between the Northern and Southern Russian armies, and winning the battle of the Vistula. The Russians were forced to retreat, and became more amenable to a peace settlement. Lenin's attitude to this episode shows the dilemma facing Russians who were also Communists; the impulse to crush and conquer an ancient foe clashed with the desire to allow the Poles, like other peoples, the right of self-determination. Trotsky had opposed this revolution-by-conquest policy on the grounds that the workers of Europe and the U.S.A. would revolt soon anyway, and Russian aggression would only harm this revolution's chances. His views eventually triumphed and the heavy and inconclusive fighting between Tukhachevsky and the French-supported Pilsudski, was brought to an end in 1920, first by armistice, and then by the Treaty of Riga.

8. *The End of the War.*

Small pockets of resistance remained to be cleared up; the Japanese did not leave Vladivostok until October, 1922; Moslems in Central Asia were crushed; and Finland, the Baltic provinces and Bessarabia, remained outside Communist control. The Bolsheviks had made a treaty with them, but Stalin and Ordjonikidze, both of whom were Georgians and treated as experts on that region, were allowed their way on the basis of their report that Bolshevism had strong popular backing there. To Trotsky's surprise, the Georgians were attacked and brought to heel with brutal methods that ignored Lenin's requests that the population should be treated with respect.

The Communists had, by 1922, secured control of much of the land once ruled by the Czar Nicholas; though large areas had been lost in the West, they controlled far

more land, far more effectively than most observers in 1918 would have thought possible. The bulk of the population, unimpressed by the claims of either side, suffered greatly by this war. Most of the fighting was done by small forces that were often poorly disciplined and heedless of the lives and property of the people they were supposed to be rescuing from the evil foe. The Bolsheviks' central position in a land of poor communications was a vital factor; they could also preach the dangers of a return to Czardom, and could exploit nationalism against the foreign assisted Whites.

E. War Communism

1. *The Suffering caused by the War.*

The urgent military situation, 1918–22, the loss of vital regions in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the dislocation of foreign trade (including, for a time, an allied blockade on Russia) were disasters bound to affect an economy already suffering from the strains of attempting to find the means of war from hopelessly inadequate resources. Hand to mouth measures were all that could be managed, in the appalling difficulties of the time, measures which led the Russian economy in the direction of considerable state control and a decreasing use of money. This trend was not deliberately planned (though it was welcomed by Left Communists) and came to be known as 'War Communism'.

2. *A Harsher Agricultural Policy.*

Lenin's policy of alliance with Left S.R.s and adoption of their Land Programme did not prove a success. The break with the Left S.R.s was accompanied by a break with their policy, for peasants were proving reluctant to part with their produce in return for roubles that had become almost worthless. Increasing state interference was therefore used. A monopoly of grain was declared, hoarders and wasters were to be dealt with by revolutionary tribunals with powers to imprison, confiscate property and condemn to compulsory public works. Peasants were turned against each other, informers were entitled to half the grain confiscated from hoarders, and the poor in

villages were organised in committees for use against the *kulaks* (whom many Communists disliked on principle for being bourgeois). Trotsky was at the head of the advocates of stern measures. He organised military expeditions to help the poor, and the 3rd Army in the Urals was transformed into a labour force. His harsh policy was opposed by Rykov and Nogin and was only tolerated only for the duration of the crisis of the civil and Polish wars.

Obviously this policy deeply offended large sections of the peasantry; state and collective farms were created, but this measure failed to compensate for the growing hostility of the peasantry. A Red Army mutiny at Saratov reflected this discontent. Able anti-Bolshevik leaders might well have exploited the situation, but the anti-Bolsheviks were divided and lacking in decision. The state failed to control food supplies; despite the Food Army Administration which organised requisitions and punished speculators, up to half urban food supplies had to come from illicit sources.

3. *The Effect on the Workers.*

Nor did War Communism please the proletariat, though wages in kind helped cushion them from the fall in the roubles' purchasing power, October, 1920, to 1 per cent of its October 1917 value. The extent of the hostility can be seen in that Kronstadt, the loyal centre of Bolshevism, was the scene of a rebellion against the government. One point of complaint was that food supplies, channelled to the workers and army by the Commissariat of Supplies (Narcomprod) proved highly unreliable. This, plus harsh labour laws in 1918 subjecting 16 to 50 year olds to labour conscription, led to an exodus to the countryside so that by 1920 the towns contained 30 per cent fewer than in 1917. A further irritation was provided by Trotsky's use of military methods which he had first applied to the railways, and then hoped to extend to other areas of the economy. This led Trotsky into serious conflict with trade union leaders, Lenin disassociated himself from Trotsky's extremism (as he did also from the Workers' Opposition who wanted the trade unions to control the factory com-

mittees and a National Production Congress to run the whole economy).

4. *The Reorganisation of Industry.*

Increasing nationalisation and a decline in the free exchange of goods took place as the government struggled to carry on. State bodies tended to take over the work of collection and distribution, money was replaced by direct allocation of supplies and wages in kind. The policy was never a success; Vesenkha lacked information and failed to co-ordinate economic policy, and many organisations ignored it and manufactured for illegal local sale. By the end of 1920 all firms with more than five workers and mechanical power, or more than 10 workers and no mechanical power, were to be nationalised. All trade was nationalised during 1918—this meant little since 1920 exports were one thousandth of 1913 exports. An adequate administration to run the system was lacking, the inspectors who checked on factory managers had to have inspectors to watch over them, a ridiculous situation, but out of it Stalin managed to create a kind of private police force from the *Rabkrin* (the Workers and Peasants Inspectorate).

In an effort to aid key industries it was decided that the designation 'shock industry' would entitle the enterprise so named to priority in fuel, materials, workers, food and organisers. As a consequence 'non-shock' industries suffered, and 'shock' industries did not necessarily gain since, often, necessary subordinate industries were given no priority. Moreover the administration was such that a factory might receive adequate raw materials and insufficient fuel, for the supplies of different commodities were in the hands of different officials.

5. *Results.*

Thus, as an attempt to organise the scarce resources of fuel, food, transport, men, machinery and raw materials, the system was an utter failure. Some Bolsheviks welcomed it as a step towards Communism, and Trotsky was in favour of increasing harshness, but Lenin, and many others, saw that as an economic policy (though 'policy' is hardly the correct word, for it implies planning and

forethought) War Communism had no hope of success, and its continuance would provoke revolt so massive that it might be disastrous. A change in policy was crucial. Lenin's good sense is shown in his realisation of this, and in both economic and foreign policies a serious reappraisal was carried out.

Books

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Hill: *Lenin and the Russian Revolution*, ch. 7.

Kennan: *The Decision to Intervene.*

Kennan: *Russia and the War under Lenin and Stalin*, chs. 5 to 11.

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Footman: 'The Red Army and the Civil War in the East', *History Today*, February, 1956.

Footman: 'The Civil War in Siberia', *History Today*, March, 1954.

Footman: *The Civil War.*

Ullman: *The Civil War in Russia.*

Questions

1. What part did Trotsky play in the Civil War?

2. Account for the failure of the Whites to win the Civil War.

3. What part did foreign intervention play in the Civil War between Whites and Reds?

4. How deliberate and planned a policy was War Communism? What were the effects of War Communism on the Soviet economy?

15. A REAPPRAISAL OF POLICIES

A. A Reappraisal of Economic Policy

1. *The Situation of Acute Distress.*

The Kronstadt revolt shook the government. The rebels demanded (March, 1921) free speech, free press, free parties, secret ballot, trade unions, and 'the Soviets without the Bolsheviks'. The suppression of this revolt raised the thorny problem of the use of violence against the toiling masses in the name of the toiling masses, the Bolsheviks were forced to argue that the interim period (until full Communism was achieved) would need the élite, the party, to ruthlessly guard the true interests of the proletariat against the misguided. The sailors on the Baltic fleet also revolted, including the crew of the battleship *Petropavlovsk*, Trotsky organised a punitive expedition which, led by Tukhachevsky, crushed the rebellions.

2. *The Adoption of the New Economic Policy.*

Party politics was reorientated to reduce distress. This change, known as N.E.P. (New Economic Policy) depended, basically, on the restoration of the market relationship in agriculture and industry in place of the forced requisitions of War Communism. The switch in policy did not go unchallenged. Since Marxists believed that the political structure of society was determined by its economic base, making that base a prosperous peasantry and a free market would, presumably, lead to the growth of bourgeois features in the political structure. Trotsky and Bukharin were already quarrelling with the Workers' Opposition led by Shliapnikov about economic control. Lenin felt that the former went too far in demanding that trade unions be fused with the state, with military discipline and compulsion to get efficiency, he did not agree with the latter that the whole economy should be transferred to a freely elected Congress of Producers.

3. *The N.E.P. and Agriculture.*

The basic measure necessary to the N.E.P. was pushed, by Lenin, through the 10th Party Congress. It substituted a fixed tax in kind per acre for the compulsory surrender to the state of the whole of the peasants' produce. Lenin

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also managed to break the real power of the Workers' Opposition, a measure which made the Communists, the party of the proletariat, even more bourgeois in composition (in 1924 Stalin estimated that only 17 – 18 per cent of the party were working class). The peasants were also allowed freedom to exchange land in order to increase the incentive to produce and surplus.

4. *The N.E.P. and Industry.*

State control over industry was reduced also. The state monopoly of supply and distribution was ended, money came into increasing use, and industries were divided into those crucial to the state, and those that were less essential. The first category, by February, 1922, consisted chiefly of war industries and closely connected enterprises; centralised state organs ran these concerns.

The second category was, supposedly, run by 16 new industrial departments of Vesenkha; in fact the initiative often came from below, not above. Industries were grouped in trusts, sometimes vertically (for example the different processes of the textile industry), sometimes horizontally (a large number of mines in the Donetz region were linked together). By the summer of 1923 there were 478 trusts registered with Vesenkha. East trust was headed by a board appointed by Vesenkha (each board member having charge of a department), and managers to run factories were appointed by the boards. Production plans were set by Vessenkha, for resources were still short and it was usual for Vesenkha to assign funds to a trust, which often simply meant the stocks of material and fuel already in that industry's possession. Financing industries remained a problem, foreign aid was not forthcoming, banks could make only trifling advances, and then at high interest rates. Nor could the state provide the necessary commercial network, so into this breach stepped the 'Nepmen' whom the state had to tolerate as a necessary evil.

The discovery of new reserves in the Urals helped alleviate the difficulties of the iron industry, but fuel and transport were a problem in iron, as in most other industries. The cotton industry, for example, had ample raw cotton reserves in Turkestan, but not the rolling

stock to move these supplies. The fuel crisis came near to paralysing production in 1921, the cement industry was down to 1 per cent of its pre-war output largely as a result of fuel shortages. Drastic reorganisation took place which helped increase coal production, and the railways were grouped in regions in order to move coal.

5. *The 'Scissors Crisis'.*

At first the N.E.P. did not produce striking results, for the peasants did not respond at once, and capital was short. When agricultural prices were high in 1922 (partly as a result of a famine in 1921) industrial prices were low as state concerns and trusts tried desperately to market their produce in order to procure food. Then, in 1923, the movement went the other way as the growing confidence of the peasants led to a rapid fall in agricultural prices at a time when industrial prices were rising. The whole episode became known as the 'scissors crisis' from the appearance of the graph showing agricultural and industrial price changes. The state tried desperately to 'close the scissors' by forcing down industrial prices and pushing up agricultural ones, there were cries of distress from all sides and credit to industries was restricted to force them to unload stocks. A Committee for Internal Trade improved maximum selling prices and more efficient production in industry also helped, but the relationship between industry and agriculture remained a very difficult problem.

B. A Reappraisal of Foreign Policy

At first the Bolsheviks' foreign policy had been dominated by the expectation of world revolution. Zinoviev, in charge of the Comintern, harried the Communist parties of other lands into following Russia's line, forcing them to break with more moderate socialists. The depression of 1920, the failure of the European revolution and Russia's need of foreign trade and loans led to an alteration in policy. Western powers, badly needing markets, were ready to talk, but the Franco-British insistance on the full restitution of the money owed by governments before the Bolsheviks, led to the collapse of negotiations.

The allies had imposed a peace on Germany which

Russia had not taken part, this led to many disgruntled Germans hoping to develop relations with Russia. This suited the Russians since they were not keen to see the West united on the platform of anti-Bolshevism, and they were able to put pressure on the Germans through Article 116 of the peace treaty which allowed Russia to obtain restitution and reparations from Germany (a clause which, the French hoped, would enable the Russians to recover enough to pay back their loans). In 1922 a conference at Genoa to discuss the economic reconstruction of Europe offended Rathenau, the German Foreign Minister, by excluding him from secret discussions, and this encouraged him to meet Chicherin (Trotsky's successor as Commissar for Foreign Affairs) at Rapallo. There they reached a mild agreement, the Russians renouncing their financial claims, the Germans promising credit, but despite its moderate nature, the Rapallo agreement caused a great stir in Europe.

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Carew-Hunt: *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, ch. 18.

Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, ch. 12.

Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, chs. 4 and 5.

Kochan: *The Making of Modern Russia*, ch. 18.

Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed*, ch. 1.

Questions

1. Why did the New Economic Policy cause such Bolshevik soul-searching?

2. How important was the Treaty of Rapallo?

3. Did events justify Lenin's advocacy of the New Economic Policy?

16. THE BATTLE FOR THE SUCCESSION TO LENIN

A. Lenin's Ill-Health

At the very time when the party had agreed to a change in policies away from the immediate attainment of Communism, it was tightening its grip on the country and suffering from increased tension in its upper ranks as a result of Lenin's illness. Lenin had been wounded by a Left S.R. who had attempted to murder him, by the end of 1921 he had abandoned full time work, in May, 1922, he had a stroke, and he could not control the growing dispute between those who hoped to succeed him.

B. The Different Candidates

1. *Trotsky.*

The obvious successor was Trotsky, but Trotsky was a fairly recent convert to Bolshevism and had differed with Lenin on several issues. Trotsky seems to have assumed that Lenin would shift power to him as a matter of course and made little effort to plan a campaign to thwart his enemies. Though he had a following in the army, Trotsky had little contact with the party machine and did not seem to realise that many eminent Bolsheviks were fearful of seeing one who seemed so extreme, imperious and prone to risky ideas, in charge of the government.

2. *Zinoviev.*

Zinoviev was a second leading figure, but he had clashed with Lenin over the question of the seizure of power, and again over the problem of alliance with other socialists. He was a capable speaker and an effective President of the Comintern, as head of the Petrograd Soviet he wielded considerable power, but his energy was not consistent, he was prone to moods of apathy and dejection. Zinoviev was supported by his friend, Kamenev, in his desire to keep Trotsky from holding supreme power, though they did not intend that Trotsky should be entirely excluded from power. Other *Politburo* members included Bukharin, the party's leading theorist and leader of the Left Communists, but not gifted with practical skills,

Tomsky, Rykov, and Kalinin, the last two were of peasant origin and were not fond of Trotsky's intellectualism.

3. *Stalin.*

This left the vague but menacing figure of Stalin whose growing power and harsh attitide to government were hidden from his colleagues for so long by his impassive silence. Lenin realised far too late the power that Stalin had amassed, and in a codicil to his testament (January, 1923) tried to warn his colleagues of Stalin's character, suggesting that he should be moved from his post as General Secretary and replaced by a more loyal, tolerant and considerate man.

Stalin had built up a large following, first as Commissar of Nationalities, then as General Secretary. In the former capacity he dealt with the affairs of nearly half of the population of the U.S.S.R., groups that were largely Asiatic or semi-Asiatic and lacked education and administrative skill. Stalin built up his contacts with the Bolsheviks of these regions.

4. *Stalin's Power as General Secretary.*

On the 3rd April, 1922, Stalin became General Secretary of the Central Committee. He replaced Krestinsky who had lost power in a purge which expelled from the party about one-third of its members, in order to rid the party of some of the very dubious elements who had rushed to join it once the party seemed the best way to power and position. Power was divided between the *Politburo*, the policy making body, and the *Orgburo* which ran party administration, scrutinising records and filling posts in the party, the administration and the unions. Stalin was a member of both bodies, and, whilst Lenin's illness shook the *Politburo*, it simply freed the Secretary from the need to account to Lenin. The work of the Secretariat grew, it prepared agenda for the *Politburo*, supplied it with documents, etc., and could thus prejudice the *Politburo*'s views on any issue before it came up for debate. The Central Control Commission which was in charge of purges was run by Kuibyshev, a devoted Stalinist, and was assigned funds which freed its local committees from dependence on the *soviets* for money. Other aspects of

Orgburo work included *Agitprop* (the Department of Agitation and Propaganda), *Orgotdel* (with a staff of inspectors who visited local organisations and inspected papers), and *Ochraspred* (which carried out the work of assigning people to appointments). Through the reports of local secretaries, and the work of the Central Control Commission, local hostility to the General Secretary was broken down. To the party intellectuals, the work carried out with such devoted care by Stalin seemed tedious; in September, 1923, in a moment of alarm, Zinoviev, Bukharin and Trotsky got themselves attached to the *Orgburo*, but Zinoviev only attended two meetings, and the other two Bolsheviks never went at all.

In January, 1924, the constitution worked out by Stalin in the previous year came into effect. Russia was proclaimed to be a Union of Soviets organised in a pyramidal system, with the Congress of Soviets at the top electing a Council of the Union (based on population) and a Council of Nationalities (based on the separate regions). From these Councils were chosen the Commissars, the members of Sovnarkom. The elections were controlled by the party, and as the elections proceeded up the pyramid from village soviets to the All Russian Congress, so the numbers of unreliable people dwindled.

The party's grip was further asserted through the O.G.P.U., the political police force which replaced the Cheka and held powers to arrest and punish suspects. Naturally Stalin saw to it that the elections produced a majority favourable to himself, and in the *Politburo* he had already convinced Kamenev and Zinoviev that they should work together to prevent Trotsky obtaining supremacy.

C. The Battle between Trotsky and Stalin

In mid-December, 1922, Lenin suffered a second stroke, in March, 1923, a third, and he could do little but dictate letters to his colleagues in the hope that they would listen. But even he was, for long, undecided as to whether to support Trotsky (whom he described as being too-self-confident and individualistic). For a time Lenin went so far

as to defend the Rabkrin (Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate) which in fact Stalin had turned into a kind of private police force, describing Trotsky's attacks on it as irresponsible. Lenin disagreed with Trotsky when Trotsky criticised Stalin for his Georgian policy, believing Trotsky to be motivated by personal animosity, but then evidence of Stalin's brutal policy there began to reach Lenin and he soon came to realise that Stalin was far more dangerous than he had seemed. Yet this realisation came too late, for Lenin's health declined, and Trotsky's handling of the struggle was inept, he did not even exploit the prestige value of the support that Lenin was now giving him. At the 12th Party Congress Stalin had the gathering well packed and Trotsky behaved mildly partly through fear of weakening party unity, at a time of difficulty in industrial affairs.

During 1923 Trotsky began to attack the Party's economic policy and to draw attention to the widening gulf between party leaders and the rank and file as a result of Stalin's system of patronage. He published his views on the 8th December in a letter to *Pravda* entitled "The New Course", and attempted to appeal to the younger generation. Forty-six prominent party members echoed Trotsky's criticisms, including Pyatkov, a popular orator, many young Communists, and Antonov-Ovseenko, the Red Army's chief political commissar. The Stalinists became alarmed, Ovseenko was sacked, and the Komsomo's Central Committee was disbanded. In January, 1924, a carefully prepared 13th Party Congress met, preceded by a volume of anti-Trotsky propaganda. At that very time Trotsky was absent from the centre of power, for ill-health forced him to take a holiday. On January 21st, 1924, Lenin died, Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev receiving the news first and, able to act promptly, represented themselves as Lenin's true heirs and even managed to overcome the attacks on Stalin included in Lenin's will. Thus Trotsky was already a defeated man, but that his defeat was to be so total was less certain and was an indication of the failure of the other Bolshevik leaders to grasp the danger of Stalin who behaved with great modesty, in contract to the flamboyant Zinoviev.

D. Conclusion

The years 1904–1924 saw the transformation of Russia from an ancient ramshackle Empire into a state whose extreme revolutionary doctrines alarmed countries who had long feared Russia's excessively reactionary attitudes. Both Czardom and Communism needed the secret police to maintain their régimes, both were autocracies, but the Okhrana were as effective as Bow Street Runners when compared with the O.G.P.U.'s successor, the N.K.V.D. The size and backwardness of Russia made autocratic government likely, but there was no inevitability about the Bolshevik success. That success was a surprise to most Marxists, for it was in the more advanced industrial nations that the revolution was supposed to come first. The fact that they were such a small minority in a land still largely peasant led Lenin to modify Marxism to suit the needs of his own country. That Marxism-Leninism became Stalinism was, again, not inevitable, but a result of the unfortunate illness of Lenin and the characters of the other Bolshevik leaders with their obsession with oratory and policy making, and their dislike of the administrative grind. This is not to say that but for Stalin, Communist rule would have been amiable; as a minority group they were bound to severely restrict freedom, as Communists they were bound to be hostile to the peasantry, but at least argument could flourish within the party without the defeated faction fearing for their very lives. Under Stalin, Russian Communism was to lose the colour and excitement brought to it by men like Trotsky, Bukharin and Zinoviev, and a menacing, grey, drab uniformity settled over the country.

Books

Clarkson: *A History of Russia*, ch. 29.
Carew-Hunt: *The Theory and Practice of Communism*, chs. 16 and 18.
Carr: *The Bolshevik Revolution*, vol. 1, ch. 14.
Kochan: *The Making of Modern Russia*, ch. 18.
Deutscher: *Stalin*, ch. 7.

Deutscher: *The Prophet Armed*, chs. 2 and 3.
Schapiro: *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, chs. 15 and 16.
Fainsod: *How Russia is Ruled*, chs. 5 and 6.

Questions

1. What were the bases of Stalin's powerful position in 1924?
2. Why was Trotsky so easily outmanoeuvred by Stalin?

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